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ABSTRACT
UNDERSTANDING INEQUALITY
SEPTEMBER 2014
MARK STELZNER, B.A., BOSTON UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gerald Friedman

In a democracy where the median income is substantially less than the mean, why does the poor
majority not implement a significant level of redistribution? Despite fears that democracy would
empower the poor majority to such ends, constituents of below average income have a mixed record
of utilizing democracy to ameliorate economic inequality in the United States. How do we
understand this puzzle? Why does the poor majority not maintain a constant level of redistribution
in a democracy? In the first part of my dissertation, I provide a game theoretic answer based on
historical research which is in accord with the broad trend in both policy and economic inequality in
the United States. In the second part of my dissertation, I present new income tax data for New
York City and Philadelphia for the 1860s. Despite limitations, this data offers a glimpse at the
income shares of the top 1, 0.1, and 0.01 percent of the population in the two premier US cities
during an important period in our economic history – a glimpse previously not possible. As we shall
see, the income shares of top one percent in New York City in the 1860s and mid-2000s are
comparable. This combined with recent data and our knowledge of US history highlights new
questions.
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INTRODUCTION
“Across the developed world,” remarked President Barak Obama in a speech given in late
2013, “inequality has increased.” “[T]his increasing inequality,” continued the President, “is most
pronounced in our country, and it challenges the very essence of who we are as a people.” Many
have made similar statements. “While the income of a minority is increasing exponentially,”
explained Pope Francis in an address to the new Vatican ambassadors in 2013, “that of the majority
is crumbling.” Even the conservative House Speaker, John Boehner agrees. “We do have an issue
of income inequality in America,” explained Boehner in an interview with the Texas Tribune in May
2014. Americans agree. A recent Gallup Poll found that 75 percent of all Democrats and 54
percent of all Republicans are dissatisfied with the level of income inequality at present. But how
unequal is income inequality in the United States? And for how long and by how much has it
increased? Analyzing our current experience with income inequality in more detail is the first step in
ultimately answering questions of why inequality has increased and how such unequal outcomes are
possible inside a political system that is based on equality. In this introductory chapter, we will
examine US income inequality, explore some potential explanations, and outline the trajectory of the
rest of this dissertation which seeks to provide answers to some of the deeper questions about
income inequality in the United States.
Income inequality – our current experience
Using income tax data, we can organize the adult population of the United States based on
each individual’s total yearly earnings from all sources (wages, bonuses, dividends, interest, capital
gains, etc.), with the individual receiving the lowest remuneration on the far left, the individual
earning the most on far right, and each individual in between arranged such that earnings descend
steadily from right to left. We can then take the top ten percent of the population, the ten percent
of the population lined up on the far right, and track its total income as a percent of national
income. In figure 1.1, I display this data for the 1950s through 2012.1 As we can see, the US went

1

Unless specified otherwise, all figures and income inequality statistics quote here include capital gains – income
from the increase in the price of an asset.
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from a relative low level of income inequality during the three decades following the Second World
War to an extremely high level at present.
From the 1950s through the 1970s, the share of total income accruing to the top ten percent
of all adults stayed between 32 and 36 percent. What does this mean? Roughly, one out of every
three dollars generated by the economic activities of all US citizens accrued to the top ten percent of
the population. The remaining two out of every three dollars went to the rest of the population (the
bottom 90 percent). This was a relatively equal distribution, and it remained more or less that way in
the three decades following World War II. Thus John F. Kennedy could rightly say in 1963 that “a
rising tide lifts all boats.” The large growth in national income between the 1950s and the 1970s
benefited income groups equally, with the average yearly income for the bottom 90 percent of the
population keeping pace with productivity growth increasing from less than $20,000 in 1950 to
almost $35,000 in the late 1970s.2
Figure i.1: Income Share of Top Ten Percent in the United States
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Source: Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel (2003), “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913
– 1998”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 1-39. For data up to 2012, see
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/#income.

This changed in the 1980s. Income inequality began to increase rapidly during the decade of
Ronald Regan and George Bush Senior, and, except for short term fluctuations, has continued to
2

These figures and all other figures referenced in this paper are in 2012 US Dollars, unless specified otherwise,
allowing for comparison across time without distortion from changes in the price level.
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increase since. By the end of the 1980s, the income share of the top ten percent had increased by
more than six percentage points from its value in 1979. In 1988, it reached 40.63 percent of all
income. This increase meant that slightly more than four out of every ten dollars generated by
economic activity in the United States accrued to the top ten percent of the population, leaving less
than six out of every ten dollars for the bottom 90 percent of the population. However, it did not
stop there. By the late 1990s, the income share of the top ten percent surpassed 45 percent. And in
2012, the last year for which we have data, the top ten percent of the population earned an
equivalent of 50.42 percent of national income. This means that more than half of all income
generated by US citizens went to the top ten percent in 2012, and less than half was left for the
bottom 90 percent of the population.
Income inequality has increased so rapidly over the last three decades that Kennedy’s
heartwarming metaphor is no longer true. Despite average yearly growth in output per worker of
around two percent in the United States, the average real income of the bottom 90 percent of the
US population has stagnated. In 1979, the average yearly income of the bottom 90 percent was
almost $34,000. Since then, the average income of the bottom 90 percent has fluctuated between
$30,000 and $37,000. However, the average over the entire period is barely more than $33,000.
Indeed, during the first three years of the current decade, the average income of the bottom 90
percent was less still – barely surpassing $31,000. As a first approximation, we can conclude that
income growth in the United States since the 1980s has exclusively benefited the top ten percent of
the population.
These outcomes are incredible. Indeed, the income share of the top ten percent of the
population in 2012 is the highest we have on record in the United States. In 1917, the first year we
have data for this group, the income share of the top 10 percent represented 40.51 percent of
national income. During the 1920s, the share of total income accruing to the top ten percent
increased rapidly. However, by 1928, the climax of the roaring twenties, it had only reached 49.29
percent of total income – more than a percentage point less than in 2012.
A peculiar characteristic of the current increase in income inequality in the United States is
that it was driven by an increase in inequality among wage incomes. What does this mean? Income
can be separated into two groups: wage and capital income. Wage income comes from working and
takes the form of wages, salaries, bonuses, and other payments to employees. This category includes
every kind of worker, from janitors and secretaries, to managers and chief financial officers (CFOs).
Capital income comes from owning financial and real assets, and takes the form of profits,
3

dividends, interest, rents, capital gains, loyalties, and any other income stream from the ownership of
an asset. The increase in the income share of the top ten percent from between 33 and 35 percent
in the late 1970s to more than 50 percent in 2012 is the result of an increase in both inequality of
financial and real estate ownership and thus an increase in inequality from capital incomes, as well as
an increase in inequality of wages. However, inequality of wages accounts for approximately twothirds of the increase of the top ten percent’s share in total income over the last three and a half
decades.
Skill biased technological change?
Explaining these dramatic increases in income inequality in the United States has become a
hot topic in the media, in political circles, and among academics. The explanation that has received
the most support from economists and politicians, at least until recently, is skill biased technological
change (SBTC). The story goes as follows: since the 1980s, technological change has been
concentrated in capital goods utilized by skilled workers.3 A common example of this type of
technological change is the computer and the internet. Utilization of these technologies requires a
high skill level. Thus the increase in productivity from computers, the internet, and other similar
technologies is exclusively captured by high skilled workers. As a result, business has increased its
demand for high skilled workers, and because the supply of high skilled workers hasn’t increased fast
enough, their wages have been bided up relative to low skilled workers.
The difference between wages for high and low skilled workers has increased since the
1970s. Controlling for education and experience, the average hourly wage for male high school
graduates in 1973 was $16.16. By 2001, it had fallen to $10.34. On the other hand, the average
hourly wage for male college graduates was $22.29 in 1973. By 2001, it had risen to $25.71.4 If we


look at the change in terms of the high-low skilled wage ratio (  ), which is the practice in


economics, we see that there was a ratio of 1.38 in 1973 and 2.49 in 2001. From this light, skill
biased technological change seems to explain the rapid increase in wage inequality.
The policy prescription for such a dynamic is simple: increase education for low skilled
workers in order to increase the number of individuals who benefit from this technological change.
As Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz explain in their recent book, The Race between Education and
3
4
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All figures are in 2001 dollars.
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Technology, wage income inequality depends on the relative progress of education and technology. If
the technology that accompanies high skilled workers improves faster than low skilled workers can
be educated and pass into the ranks of high skilled workers, wage inequality increases. And if low
skilled workers can be educated more rapidly, diminishing the relative size of the low skilled worker
pool, wage inequality decreases. Any minimum wage for low skilled workers or wage ceiling for
high skilled workers would have deleterious effects on employment, growth, and education.
Although presented in a more sophisticated mathematical dress, the idea behind SBTC is not
new. Speaking about the Gilded Age which spanned from the 1870s to the turn of the twentieth
century—a period of increasing income inequality similar to that in which we are living today—
Andrew Carnegie argued, “Individualism, Private Property, the Law of Accumulation of Wealth, and
the Law of Competition are the highest results of human experience, the soil in which society so far
has produced the best fruit. Unequally and unjustly, perhaps, as these laws sometimes operate,”
continued Carnegie, “and imperfect as they appear to the Idealist, they are nevertheless, like the
highest type of man, the best and most valuable of all that humanity has yet accomplished.” 5 For
Carnegie and many of his contemporaries, the dramatic increase in income inequality during the
Gilded Age represented the proper functioning of the market – the ascendance of great
entrepreneurs uniquely able to organize men and machines and mold their activities so as to produce
immense wealth for all. These men had skills that were extremely valuable in the context of the
technological change that took place during the Gilded Age. As a result of the value and scarcity of
these skills, their incomes skyrocketed relative to those of the average worker.
One main difference between SBTC today and ideas like those expressed by Carnegie and
his contemporaries is that the latter was often tinged in a much more racist and sexist tone. Past
theories similar to SBTC often went hand in hand with the theory of social Darwinism promulgated
by English philosopher Herbert Spencer, and were used to justify eugenics, the manipulation of
fertility through sterilization such to reduce certain populations, and restrictions on immigration
from undesirable countries. In its current form, SBTC is not presented in the same tone. However,
in the construction of data used to give support to the SBTC theory, the large wage differences
between African Americans and whites, and men and women, with similar experience and education
levels are assumed to be the result of differences in productivity rather than institutionalized racism

5
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and sexism. To the degree that this is incorrect, there are racial and sexist undertones that parallel
the more overt expression of the past.
SBTC is a powerful theory; explaining the astronomical increase in wage inequality as the
result of individuals skills and preferences coupled with technological change helps to depoliticize
the topic. It removes individuals from society and explains the large variation in outcomes based on
differences in the characteristics of individuals. Laws and institutions have little role, if any, in these
developments except maybe to further complicate the issue. Increasing inequality is not the result of
reducing taxes on those at the upper reaches of the income ladder. Nor is it the result of the
declining power of unions in the private sector and politics. Rather, it is the result of the changing
productivity, the changing social utility, of certain groups, and the political system would be ill
advised to interfere in the process by any other means than increasing access to education for the
less fortunate. Such a justification is immensely important in a society where the political system is
democratic. Although never perfect in practice, democracy is based on the theory of equality of
representation. The existence of inequality in a democracy begs the question: how can an economic
system that yields such unequal results co-exist inside a political system based on equality? The
power of SBTC is that it justifies an extremely unequal economic system in a democratic society.
The debate since the 1970s has assumed that inequality is a natural and necessary result of
growth, and thus, the economic system does not fundamentally conflict with the political system.
“This mixture of equality and inequality sometimes smacks of inconsistency and even insincerity,”
concluded Arthur Okun in his classic book “Equality and Efficiency: the Big Tradeoff.” “Yet I
believe that, in many cases,” Okun continued, “the institutional arrangements represent uneasy
compromises rather than fundamental inconsistencies.”6 For Okun, who set the debate in economic
and political circles for the last four decades, society faces a tradeoff between equality and growth
and most decide to what degree its want to “compromise” growth for equality. The political system
is the realm which humanizes the sometimes rough, yet always efficient economy. This debate did
not stem from SBTC. Instead, SBTC was the natural explanation of wage inequality inside the
context of the school of thought from which Okun was speaking.
Why is it important that the economic and political system represent a compromise and not
a conflict? If SBTC or some other merit-based theory fails to explain the increase in income
inequality in the United States, and thus extreme inequality is not justified on efficiency and merit,
then the need for explanation multiplies. Aside from explaining the increase in income inequality in
6
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economic terms, one would have to explain why and how such an unequal outcome could persist,
and indeed worsen over a period of three and a half decades, in a democracy. Such a discussion is
messier than explaining outcomes as the result of relative social worth. For some, including neocons
like Rick Santorum, who wants to ban the word “middle class,” it is a discussion that is best avoided.
However, it seems more important now than ever to have this discussion. Why? Because SBTC is
not as convincing once we more critically analyze income inequality and technological change in the
United States and abroad.
To only look at the income share of the top ten percent would miss a central aspect of
income inequality in the US. Why? Because the majority of the increase in income inequality in the
United States has taken place at the upper reaches of the income ladder – not the top ten percent of
the population, but the top one percent, the top 0.1 percent and higher. In figure 1.2, I display the
income share of the top one percent of the population from the 1950s to present. As we can see, it
stayed between eight and thirteen percent of all income from the 1950s through the 1970s. Roughly
one of every ten dollars generated from economic activity accrued to the top one percent of the
population during this period.
Figure i.2: Income Share of Top One Percent in the United States
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Source: Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel (2003), “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913
– 1998”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 1-39. For data up to 2012, see
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/#income.
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There was even a significant downward trend. During the 1950s, the average yearly share of
the top one percent was just shy of 11 percent of all income. By the 1970s, this figure had fallen
almost two percentage points, averaging just over nine percent of all income during the 1970s. Like
with the share of the top ten percent during this period, these values represent a relatively low level
of income inequality. However, this changed dramatically in the 1980s. The income share of the
top one percent began to increase, and it did so more rapidly than that of the top ten percent. By
2012, it had reached 22.46 percent of all income, representing an increase of 144 percent since the
1970s.
What does this mean? If you look at the bottom nine percent of the top ten percent group,
that is the top ten percent excluding the top one percent, its experience has differed significantly
from that of the top ten percent as a whole. In figure 1.3, I display the income share of these two
overlapping income groups. As we can see, the share of the bottom nine percent of the top ten
percent increased from around 24 percent in the 1970s to around 28 percent currently – a 15
percent increase.
Figure i.3: Income Share of Top Ten and Bottom Nine Percent in the United States

Top 10%

Bottom 9 of top 10%

Source: Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel (2003), “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913
– 1998”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 1-39. For data up to 2012, see
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/#income.

This is a significant change relative to the bottom 90 percent of the population who saw
their share of total income fall dramatically. However, it is miniscule compared to the astronomical
8

increase in the income share of the top one percent. Indeed, the growth of the income share of the
top one percent was so large over the past three decades that it is responsible for 78 percent of the
growth of the income share of the top ten percent. The divergence between the top one percent
and the rest of the top ten percent can be seen visually in figure 1.3. The growing gap between the
two series in figure 1.3 represents the increase in the share of total income going exclusively to the
top one percent.
The unbelievable aspect of this story is that it does not stop there. The income share of the
top 0.1 percent of the population, the top ten percent of the top one percent, went from 2.83
percent of all income in the 1970s to 11.33 percent in 2012. Let’s take a minute to let this sink in.
Over the last thirty years, the income accruing to this group has increased so rapidly relative to that
accruing to the rest of the population that its share of total income has quadrupled. Despite the
exclusiveness of this elite group, the increase in its income share was so spectacular that it accounted
for 56 percent of the growth in the income share of the top ten percent, and 72 percent of the
growth in the income share of the top one percent over the last three decades. To illustrate this
point, in figure 1.4, I display the income share of the top one percent and of the bottom 0.9 percent
of the same group.
Figure i.4: Income Share of Top One and Bottom 0.9 Percent in the United States
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Bottom 0.9 of top 1%

Source: Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel (2003), “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913
– 1998”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 1-39. For data up to 2012, see
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/#income.

9

As we can see by the growing gap between the two series, the vast majority of the top one
percent did not share in the astronomical gains made by the top one percent as a whole. This
discrepancy represents the increase in the share of total income going exclusively to the top 0.1
percent.
If we explain the increase in inequality as a result of the relative increase in rewards to high
skilled workers, how do we explain such different outcomes between the different groups inside of
the top ten percent? Everyone inside the top ten percent group are high skilled workers; the ranks
of the bottom nine percent of the top ten percent include lawyers, doctors, business owners,
professors, managers, engineers, etc. Why did technological change benefit the top one percent and
not the rest of the top ten percent? Furthermore, why did technological change so
disproportionately benefit the top 0.1 percent and not the rest of the top one percent or the top ten
percent? Has technological change been so biased as to reward only a tiny fraction of high skilled
workers? Using SBTC to explain such developments – which are central to our experience with
income inequality – seems simplistic and reaching.
As Thomas Piketty explains in his recent book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the extreme
increase in inequality in the United States over the past three decades is a direct result of the rise of
supermanagers in the financial and nonfinancial sectors of the economy. One recent study found
that executives at nonfinancial firms make up 43 percent of the top 0.1 percent group; executives
from financial firms made up 18 percent; and lawyers and real estate owners made up 12 percent.
Not surprisingly, we can see the same trend in income inequality inside big firms as we can see for
the nation as a whole. For example, the compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) of
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 companies has increased astronomically relative to their average
worker. In 1983, the compensation of S&P 500 CEO averaged 46 times that of their workers. In
1993, it reached 195, and, in 2013, the compensation of S&P 500 CEO averaged 331 times that of
their workers. CEO pay is determined by the board of directors of the company. However, CEOs
appoint and set the salaries for board members and thus have considerable leverage in the
determination of their own remuneration. Explaining the evolution of CEO remuneration is central
to understanding the increase in income inequality in the United States. However, SBTC does not
offer a convincing explanation.
Another flaw with the SBTC theory is that income inequality in many developed countries
has not followed the same trend. For example, in France from the 1950s to the present, the income
share of the top ten percent of the population has fluctuated between 30 and 37 percent of all
10

income; between the 1990s and today, its share has been stable between 33 and 34 percent of all
income. By this measure, there have been no long-term secular increases in income inequality since
the 1980s. At present, income inequality in France is of the same general level as it was in the three
decades following World War II in the United States. If we look at the income share of the top one
percent in France, we see the same story. The share of this elite group has fluctuated between seven
and ten percent of all income from the 1950s to today. Currently, roughly nine percent of all
income accrues to the top one percent in France, representing an increase since 1980. However, it is
only on the order of one percentage point as opposed to more than 13 percentage points in the
United States.
Why is this important? If SBTC is the reason for the increase in wage inequality in the
United States, why is it not working in France? France is also a developed country at the cusp of the
world technology frontier. High skilled workers there utilized improvements in computers, the
internet, and other technological advances. Why do we not see the same trend in France?
One might be inclined to dismiss France as an aberrant. However, it is not the only nation
that has escaped dramatic increases in income inequality since the 1980s. As Piketty so thoroughly
illustrates, France is actually representative of continental Europe and Japan, as well. To illustrate
this point, in figure 1.5, I display the income share of the top one percent in Japan, Sweden, and the
United States. As we can see, in Sweden, the income share of the top one percent has increased
since the 1980s. However, it was around four percent in 1980 and is only seven percent now – still
significantly below that of the United States during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
In Japan, the income share of the top one percent has remained between seven and ten
percent of all income since the 1950s. Save small differences in levels, this story is the same
Germany, Denmark, Italy, Spain, and continental Europe in general. Thus, we can ask again, but
this time more broadly, if SBTC is the reason for the increase in wage inequality in the United States,
why is it not producing similar outcomes in other advanced industrial economies where
technological change is the same? Curiously, the only other countries that have had similar,
although not as dramatic, experiences with income inequality since the 1980s are the other English
speaking advanced industrial nations – Britain, Canada, and Australia. This peculiarity suggests
other explanations based on shared norms and political systems.
Another problem with the SBTC argument is that technology has been constantly evolving
throughout the history of the United States. However, outcomes in income inequality have followed
radically different trajectories during different periods in US history. For example, the newspapers
11

in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were full of concern that contemporary technological change would
lead to the elimination of jobs and increasing inequality.
Figure i.5: Income Share of Top One Percent
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However, as we have seen, the income share of the top ten percent of the population in the
United States remained stable at a relative low level, and the income share of the top one percent
actually decreased throughout this period. Why is the technological change at present different
from the past? Curiously, in academic papers building cases for SBTC, the issue of technology is
casually assumed – there is generally no real data to support the biased nature of productivity growth
except for increasing income inequality itself. However, it is not obvious that technological change
since the 1980s has been generally skilled biased. For example, it seems that computer programs
that check medical symptoms with databases of diseases and output diagnoses would negatively
affect doctors by allowing individuals with less education to take over parts of their responsibilities.
If so, this type of technological changed would be biased to the detriment, not the benefit, of skilled
workers.
What then is driving income inequality?
SBTC is laden with many holes, and thus seems to be a poor explanation for the rise in
income inequality in the United States since the 1980s. What then is driving the increase in income
12

inequality? In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty provides another explanation for the
increase in income inequality: when the return on capital is higher than growth, which he shows is
typically the case, the stock of wealth grows relative to the economy. Because income from capital is
more unequal than income from wages, the growing importance of wealth means that income
inequality is increasing. Piketty also shows that wealth inequality and the inheritance of wealth,
versus savings over the life cycle, has increased reducing the importance of merit. All of these
developments bring us closer to the “patrimonial capitalism” of the 19th century. While the
importance of the mechanism he introduces, his meticulous documentation of historical economic
series, and the clarity in which he presents the issues makes his work a classic, Piketty’s main
findings, as he admits, does not explain the majority of the increase in income inequality in the
United States. As mentioned earlier, a peculiar, yet central aspect of the US experience is that
increase in wage inequality accounts for two thirds of the increase in income inequality over the last
three and a half decades. Yet, the main thrust of Piketty’s book is about capital holding and capital
incomes.
As a result, the questions that we posit earlier resurface. What is driving the extreme
increase in inequality in the United States? Is it possibly the result of non-meritorious forces? Why
has it persisted for so long? To put our current experience in context and hopefully understand it
better, we can ask additional questions: have we had similar experiences in the past? If so, how
were they similar? How were they different? Finally, more questions surface if we find that social
worth and efficiency don’t explain the extreme rise in income inequality. We must ask: how has
inequality coexisted in a democratic society?
My dissertation contributes to this debate three ways. Each contribution represents a
different chapter. In the first chapter, I develop a game theoretic model which explains the
evolution of income inequality in the United States from the 1870s to present as the result of the
orientation of laws and institutions which change as different groups in society capture policy
control. A group’s success at projecting itself into the political arena and taking control of policy
depends on its relative ability to overcome its free rider problem and act collectively. This is because
political action for a group good is a public goods game. Individuals have both selfish and group
regarding preferences. Selfish preferences lead to free riding. Group regarding preference activate
individuals and spur them to engage in political action. The more individuals judge laws and
institutions unfair in regards to their group the more successfully the group is in organizing and
taking control of the political arena. I model the dynamics assuming two groups, rich and poor, and
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finds that conservative cycles result. Government policy oscillates between pro-poor and pro-rich.
As the poor take control of the agenda, they gradually tilt laws and institutions in their favor.
Inequality decreases. However, this very development leads elites to mobilize. Mobilization
eventually leads to elites gaining control of politics and tilting gains from economic activity back in
their favor. Inequality increases. The extension of these policies and increase in inequality motivates
the poor to mobilize and eventually retake control of the government.
In the second chapter, I uncover data from Civil War income tax, the first income tax in the
history of the United States. From which, I calculate both national and city level statistics for the
income share of the top one percent in the 1860s. These figures are comparable to figures for the
20th and 21st century. As we shall see, while income inequality in New York City and Philadelphia
was extremely high during the Civil War decade, the share of national income accruing to the top
one percent of the population in the late 1860s represents a low in US history comparable to the late
1960s and early 1970s. Thus, I show in this chapter that the Kuznets curve in the United States
already completed its famed upside down ‘U’ trajectory, although abruptly, during the Civil War
decade and began to double back on itself during the Gilded Age.
In the third chapter, I develop a series for the orientation of laws and institutions from the
1870s through the 1920s in the United States and compare it to our experience with income
inequality. As we shall see, laws and institutions moved in unison with income inequality. As the
income share of the top one percent increased throughout the end of the 19th century and into the
first decade of the 20th century, laws and institutions were oriented more and more to benefit those
at the top of the income ladder. When the income share of the top one percent fell during
Woodrow Wilson’s second term as president, laws and institutions were, relative to the Gilded Age,
oriented to empower broader portions of the population. And again in the 1920s, when the income
share of the top one percent sky rocketed, laws and institutions were again slanted in the favor of
those at the top of the income ladder. Thus, in this chapter, I show that, if not a product of,
government policy embraced developments in income inequality from the 1870s through the 1920s.
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CHAPTER 1
POLITICAL CONTEST, POLICY CONTROL, AND INEQUALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES

The Paradox
In a democracy where the median income is substantially less than the average, why does the
poor majority not implement a significant level of redistribution? Fears that democracy would
empower the poor majority to do exactly that have haunted political economists at every step in the
development of suffrage in the history of the United States.
Shaken by the events of the 1780s, James Madison became convinced that universal suffrage
threatened property and, as a result, that democracy must be controlled to protect property.7 “There
are particular moments in public affairs when the people,” explained Madison in The Federalist, “may
call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and to
condemn… Liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power.”
That is, political liberty, in the form of popular self-government, could threaten personal liberties,
namely, property. And, “the former [popular self-government], rather than the latter [power],”
continued Madison, “are apparently most to be apprehended by the United States.”8 This view was
widely shared. “Remember, democracy [that is, a true, decentralized self-government by the people]
never lasts long,” warned John Adams, “It soon wastes, exhausts and murders itself.”9 Thus the
perceived threat of universal suffrage and significant inequality prompted Federalists to advocate
“restriction of popular democracy and the centralization of sovereignty in the national supreme
government.”10
Almost a century later, in the final days of the Civil War, opinions had changed. Most
Republicans would have agreed with Sinclair Tousey, president of the American News Company
and fellow Republican, when he stated that there is no reason to fear “placing too much power in
the hands of the Federal Government” if it was of the people. However, in the late 1860s, radical
7
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reconstruction of the South and the eight hour movement and its utilization of politics to achieve
results alarmed many Americans in the same way the 1780s had Madison and other federalists.
“[T]he passionate pursuit of equality of conditions on which the multitude seems now entering, and
the elevation of equality of conditions into the rank of the highest political good,” exclaimed Edwin
Godkin, editor of The Nation and key figure in the Liberal movement, “will eventually prove fatal to
art, to science, to literature, and to law; and that, after having gone down into barbarism, and
witnessed the decay and destruction of all the great monuments of our epoch, we shall have to begin
again the old and toilsome ascent made by our forefathers under the lash of hunger and the brute
rule of force.”11 Like Madison, Godkin was not alone. “It became only too apparent that a whole
people, swept by a flood of excitement,” explained Washington Gladden, member of the Republican
party, “may go hopelessly wrong.” These convictions did not lead Godkin and other liberals to
advocate limitations of universal suffrage. Instead, they worked to limit the domain of democratic
legislation to prevent attacks on personal liberties.12 At the same time, many felt, as Gladden
expounded that salvation lay “in the rise of a class of leaders who have the courage to resist the
mob.”13
Despite such prevalent and reoccurring fears, constituents of below average income have a
mixed record of utilizing democracy to ameliorate economic inequality. Indeed, from the late-1970s
to present, economic inequality increased more or less continuously. And, from 1870 to 1929, while
data is sparse and has problems of comparability, it seems that inequality was also increasing.14
These trends were not in spite of efforts to arrest or reduce inequality. On the contrary, the
orientation of laws and institutions during these two periods embraced inequality by balancing
taxation on regressive sources, reducing redistribution, and empowering minority groups in the
economic realm at the expense of the majority. From the 1870s to the mid-1930s, federal taxation
Foner, E. (1988). Reconstruction: America's unfinished revolution, 1863-1877. New York: Harper & Row. Montgomery,
D. (1967). Beyond equality: Labor and the radical Republicans, 1862-1872. New York: Knopf. Quote from Godkin
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was almost entirely in the form of tariffs on imports and excise taxes – both of which were
regressive.15 Likewise, since the late 1970s, income taxes on those at the upper reaches of the
income ladder have been dramatically reduced rebalancing the burden on those at the bottom.
Average federal tax rates for the top one percent of income earners fell from just below 49 percent
in 1970 to around 30 percent in 2004. For the top 0.1 percent, average federal tax rates dropped
from around 65 percent to below 35 percent. And, for the top 0.01 percent, average tax rate fell
from above 75 percent to below 35 percent. As a result, from 1980 to 2003, the degree to which
taxation reduced inequality in the United States fell by more than 25 percent.16
Government’s attitude towards labor has been similar during the two periods although
arguably more extreme in the early period. The end of the 19th century saw the beginning of rule by
injunction and the empowerment of the National Guard and federal government to act as a strike
breaker.17 In 1895, the Supreme Court gave its official stamp on developments ruling that the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act excluded manufacturing (United States v. E.C. Knight Co.) but maintained that
the Act’s trust busting powers pertained to labor unions (Debs).18 Thus, heralded as an answer to the
unrelenting concentration of industry and the increase in economic inequality, the Sherman AntiTrust Act of 1890 was turned against those that it purported to help. Likewise, during the latter
period of sustained increase in economic inequality, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a
hallmark of the New Deal created to protect labor’s prerogative to bargain collectively, was
systematically dismantled through a reduction in funds to the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), appointment of board members unsympathetic to labor, and re-interpretation of the
NLRA.19 “Collective bargaining frequently means labor monopoly, the destruction of individual
freedom and the destruction of the marketplace as the mechanism for determining the value of
labor,” explained Donald Dotson a few years before Reagan appointed him to chair the NLRB.
Moving with the winds of political change, Dotson and the other appointees rapidly reoriented the
NLRB in the early 1980s. “In only 150 days the new majority has reversed at least eight major
precedents,” reported Business Week in 1984. “By some estimates, it has already recast nearly 40
percent of the decisions made since the mid-1970s that the conservatives found objectionable.” In
15
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response to one such reversal which allowed a unionized plant to move operations to a nonunion
facility while its contract with the union was still in effect, Dotson explained that the NLRA “is still
sound… [Instead] one of the problems in the past has been the way previous boards have
interpreted it. Of course, the board can change those interpretations without having to urge
Congress to change the law.”20
Contrary to its original purpose, the NLRB became more of a hindrance to collective action
than a facilitator of it. “The act and the National Labor Relations Board,” explained Philip Sipser, a
political activist and labor lawyer, “have become a millstone around labor’s neck and create a
dangerous illusion that workers, unions and the institutions of collective bargaining are protected.
Nothing could be further from the truth.”21
The impression from the brief examination of the two periods of secular increase in
economic inequality might lead one to believe that our democratic system does not work. In which
case, the paradox posited above is not a paradox. Instead, significant inequality exists because the
seeming empowerment of the masses is only a clever subterfuge. However, there are times when
our democracy does seem to work. For example, beginning in the mid-1930s and accelerating
during World War II, economic inequality dramatically decreased and remained relatively low until
the mid-1970s.22 This decrease in inequality was coincident with reconfiguration of laws and
institutions which worked actively to stem the growth of and even reduce economic inequality. For
example, the National Labor Relations Act, mentioned above, which gave labor the right to bargain
collectively, was signed into law in 1935. The Fair Labor Standards Act, which created a minimum
wage, a maximum work week, and abolished child labor, was signed into law in 1938. Likewise,
federal income surtax rates on the upper reaches of the income ladder were increase in the 1930s. In
1934, the surtax on net incomes over $1 million was increased from 55 to 59 percent, and, in 1935, it
was increase to 73 percent.23
There are exceptions to the trend in any of the three periods. Some of these exceptions are
not well explained in the stylized model presented below. Others can be explained by the addition
of a little nuance. An example of the latter, the Taft Hartley Act of June, 1947 moved in the
20
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opposite direction of New Deal legislation by prohibiting certain union actions. Another exception
which can be explained through the addition of a little nuance is the liberal tendencies during the
Progressive Era, especially Woodrow Wilson’s two terms as President, and the dramatic shift back to
the right during the 1920s. However, for now, let us set these exceptions aside and focus on
explaining the general trends during the three periods outlined above.24 After, we will return to
these examples. Thus overall there seems to be times when laws and institutions are set up to
reduce inequality and times where they are set up to embrace it. How do we explain this? Why
doesn’t the poor majority maintain a constant level of redistribution in a democracy where they are
seemingly empowered?
A Possible Answer
A potential answer to this puzzle is that political action25 for a group good is a public goods
game, and individuals exhibit both selfish and group regarding tendencies. Selfish preferences in a
public goods game result in individuals not contributing – i.e. free riding. At the same time, group
regarding preferences motivate individuals to contribute to political action. However, they are
conditional on perceptions of the fairness of the system in regards to the group and thus vary with
changes in laws and institutions. As a result, sometimes selfish preferences dominate and other
times group regarding preferences dominate. When selfish preferences dominate, groups are
plagued by inaction – no matter their size. On the other hand, when group regarding preferences
dominate, a group is able to act collectively.
Let us set aside group regarding preferences for now and focus on selfish preferences and
actions that result from them. Four characteristics are necessary and sufficient for political action to
be defined as a public goods game. One, individuals seeking the same end in the political arena
cannot create complete contracts permissible in court to bind each other’s actions. Two,
contributing to the group good entails direct personal sacrifices. Three, for a given individual, the
contributions of all other individuals engaged in like political action increase his payoff. Four, the
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marginal cost of engaging in political action is greater than the marginal benefit.26 In equation (1), I
formalize the general payoff facing a selfish individual engaging in a public goods game:
 
 is the payoff for the ith individual.
and ∑








∑




(1)

is the cost of contributing incurred by the ith individual,

is the summation of the contributions of all N individuals engaging in the public goods

game. Some proportion, , of these contributions accrue to the ith individual. For the game to be a
public goods game,

has to be less than one. If this is the case, the best response for the ith

individual is to contribute nothing.
In terms of political action, the cost of contributing can take many forms. It can be as
simple as the amount one donates to a campaign or as risky as participating in a protest or strike
which faces repression by private or public authorities. At the same time, the cost of contributing
can be the potential loss of one’s job in the case that engaging in the political contest runs counter to
the employer’s interest. I will explore this topic in more depth below. The benefit from engaging in
a political contest is legislation, change in administration of existing institutions, or interpretation of
existing laws. This could take the form of a change in tax or labor laws or a change in the amount
or redistributive nature of government spending.
As stated above, for a selfish individual engaging in a public goods game, the best response
is to contribute nothing – i.e. to free ride. However, while individuals exhibit selfish tendencies, they
also exhibit group regarding preferences, behaviors motivated by their perceptions of their group’s
condition in society. One type of group regarding preference is the strong group fairness motive,
where an individual’s action is driven by his assessment of the condition of his group relative to
what he perceives as fair. The action confers a benefit on members of the group while inflicting a
cost on the individual. Thus, if an individual exhibits the strong group fairness motive and perceives
the policies of a particular political system as unfair in regards to his group, he will act on the group’s
behalf even though it is not individually beneficial in a strictly monetary sense. In equation (2), I
formalize the above argument for an individual that perceives taxation to be unfair:
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Equation (2) is the same as equation (1) except for the last term,   . T represents the rate of
taxation.



is the contribution of the individual, and  is some constant proportion. For a non-

zero value of taxation, i.e.   0, the individual receives a payoff proportional to his contribution

from engaging in the political contest. This payoff, encompassed in   , should be thought of as a
moral or social payoff as opposed to a monetary payoff. Thus, if taxation is high enough, if





, the best response for the individual, taking into account both monetary, moral, and social

payoffs, is to contribute to the political contest.
For a group composed of individuals whose payoffs from engaging in political action can be
described by equation (2), the more intruding policy is towards the group or the more individuals
expect from policy in regards to their group, the greater the total contribution is to the political
struggle. Thus, if two groups are fighting over control of the political agenda, all else equal, the
group that judges laws and institutions to be more unfair will muster more resources for political
action and, as a result, win control the political agenda.
Taking from Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), in the model formalized below, I assume that
individuals form two groups: rich and poor.27 I also assume that perceptions of fairness, although
different for each group, are exogenously given and constant.28 Inequality is both what each group
is trying to control and what spurs individuals to political action. As we shall see, the above
dynamics lead to conservative cycles. Government policy oscillates between pro-rich and pro-poor.
As the poor take control of the agenda, they gradually tilt more and more of the gains from
economic activity in their favor. Inequality decreases. However, at some point, the socioeconomic
developments ushered in by the pro-poor government lead elites to mobilize. Mobilization
eventually leads to elites gaining control of politics and tilting gains from economic activity back in
their favor. Inequality increases. As before, the extension of these policies and increase in inequality
motivates the poor to mobilize. Eventually, socioeconomic pressures reach a boiling point, and the
poor retake control of the government.
27
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From this understanding, the answer to the original paradox is that change is gradual, and
control in a democracy is not as simple as pure numbers. Before a vote can occur, interest groups
have to mobilize to formulate the issues, provide information, encourage turnout, etc. However,
this process suffers from the free rider problem. Motivation to overcome the free rider problem
derives from activation of group regarding preferences which are conditional on one’s perception of
the fairness of the system. As a result, control of the agenda and thus positive policy outcomes
eventually lead to loss of control. Change in laws and institutions to correct or embrace inequality
lead to mobilization of the opposing group and, eventually, its ascendance.
Cost of Political Action
The cost of political action can take many forms. In some instances it takes the form of a
campaign donation. For example, in the campaign of 1896, in efforts to combat the radical threat
then embodied in the Democratic Party, business and banking interests poured money into
Republican coffers. Standard Oil and J.P. Morgan each donated $250,000. The four largest meatpacking houses of Chicago gave $400,000 in total. New York Life Insurance gave “large portions of
their clients’ premiums.” Officially, Republican campaign funds for the election reached $3.5
million. However, counting unofficial contributions their war chest was somewhere between $10
and $16.5 million.29 In contrast, the Democrats had a “campaign chest of only $650,000”.30 These
donations contributed to McKinley’s victory. From them, the Republican Party was able to print
“120,000,000 copies of 275 different pamphlets in English, German, Italian, Polish, Yiddish, Greek,
Swedish, and other languages,” and broadcast to millions the speeches of McKinley and those of
other prominent party members.31
From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, campaign donations were again a very visual cost of
political action. Business poured money into political action committees (PACs) – a legal entity
created to enable labor unions and corporations to contribute to political campaigns. Within a
decade, total contributions to PACs created to further business’s interests in congress increased by
nearly five hundred percent. While unions also utilized PACs to further their political struggle, total
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contributions to labor PACs only increased by fifty percent over the same period. As a result, by
1980, corporate PAC donations to political campaigns outpaced union PAC donations.32
The cost of political action can take other forms. For example, among laboring groups, it
often takes the form of donating time and even risking injury or arrest by actively participation in a
protest. The history of the United States is riveted with such instances. For example, on March 6,
1930, international unemployment day, jobless workers in cities across the nation took to the streets
to protest their suffering and government inaction. Some of these protests were peacefully received
by local authorities. For example, in San Francisco, more than 2,000 unemployed protested without
problems. Likewise, in Chicago, over 4,000 unemployed protested peacefully. However, in many
cases, authorities were hostile to unemployment demonstrations. In Cleveland, the unemployment
protest, which drew 10,000 jobless workers, ended in chaos when a “battle” broke out between the
thousands of unemployed and several hundred police officers. The New York Times explains that
“Scores of men and women were trampled by the charging horses of the police, and more than 100
were injured by flying police clubs during the melee.” In New York, 35,000 unemployed gather in
Union Square to protest. The rally quickly fell to violence as the demonstrators decided to march on
City Hall. The Times explains that “an army of 1,000 police, mounted and on foot, supported by
scores of detectives, motorcycle men… swinging nightsticks, blackjacks and bare fists, rushed into
the crowd, hitting out at all with whom they came in contact… from all parts of the scene of battle
came the screams of women and cries of men with bloody heads and faces. A score of men were
sprawled over the square, with policemen pummeling them.”33
Both campaign contributions and participation in a protest represent a cost of political
action. In terms of the former, the person or entity that donates incurs a cost – the donation. In
terms of the latter, the person that engages in a protest sacrifices her time and potentially much
more. While donating and engaging in a protest are very different, exploring the differences
between the two forms of political action would take us too far afield. As a result, for purposes
here, it suffices to make a somewhat crude assumption that different types of costs of engaging in
political action span a one dimensional axis which differentiates between magnitudes.
A Public Goods Game
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In order to model the payoff function of individuals as we have above, it is essential that
political action can be characterized as a public goods game. For this to be the case, political action
must be non-cooperative, non-excludable to members of the same group, and the marginal cost of
political action must be greater than the marginal benefit.
Both campaign contributions and participation in a protest only bring benefits in the case
that a candidate that represents the movement’s cause wins. Also, the benefits are not contractual
and not excludable. The act of forging a voting base for a political candidate through protest or
donations in hopes that he will carry forward some beneficial legislation or block some harmful
legislation is not written down in an explicit contract which is permissible in court. Thus the
benefits of group action are not binding, and the interaction represents a non-cooperative game. At
the same, the benefits of legislation are not excludable to members of the group that did not support
the political fight. Evaluating whether the marginal cost of political action is greater than the
marginal benefit is more difficult. However, imagine the benefit created by one person staying an
hour longer at a protest. In terms of increasing the probability of success of the cause the protest is
supporting, the marginal benefit is probably very low. At the same time, because the donation of
one hour of time is concentrated in that one person, the cost is much larger. While this brief
exploration is not conclusive, I will assume that the marginal cost is larger than the marginal benefit.
Thus, political action for a group good is a public goods game, and as a result the best response for
selfish individuals is to contribute nothing – i.e. to free ride.
Mobilization
As explained above, individuals are not only characterized by selfish tendencies. Many
individuals, if not all, exhibit strong group fairness motives. Indeed, I would argue that most of the
actions described above, whether campaign contributions or participating in protests, are motivated
by such preferences. In the example of international unemployment day, it seems more obvious that
the actions of protestors could be described as a response to perceptions that the system was unfair
in regards to a specific group – unemployed workers or more generally workers. However, it is also
the case with elites.
In 1971, Lewis Powell, a Richmond lawyer, former president of the American Bar
Association, member of the board of directors of several large corporations, and soon to be
Supreme Court Justice, wrote a confidential memorandum to the Chamber of Commerce. In this
memo, Powell seems to be calling on businessmen to act collectively because of the unfairness of
24

the system in regards to business. He starts by rebuking the individualistic attitude of businessmen
in the past and spurs them to act collectively and retake control of politics. “[A]s every business
executive knows,” explained Powel, “few elements of American society today have as little influence
in government as the American businessman, the corporation, or even the millions of corporate
stockholders… the American business executive is truly the “forgotten man.” While business was
not without power at the time Powell was writing his memo, it was indeed suffering from a series of
legislative defeats.34 “Business must learn the lesson,” continued Powell, “that political power is
necessary; that such power must be assiduously cultivated; and that when necessary, it must be used
aggressively and with determination – without embarrassment and without the reluctance which has
been so characteristic of American business.”35
The strong group fairness motive provides a way for a group to overcome the free rider
problem and mobilize collectively. All else equal, the more intruding policy is towards a group or
the more individuals expect from policy in regards to their group, the more effective a group can
mobilize collectively and contest political control. Thus, if two groups are fighting over control of
the political agenda, the group that judges laws and institutions to be relatively more unfair in
regards to his group will muster more resources for political action and, as a result, win control the
political agenda.
The mid-1970s provides an example of an increase in the perceived unfairness of legislation
and business’s resulting move to collective action. A leading political scientist on the period, David
Vogel explains that “from 1969 to 1972, virtually the entire American business community
experienced a series of political setbacks without parallel in the postwar period.”36 In December
1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) which declared “the
improvement of the quality of the environment to be a major priority.”37 The aim of NEPA, and
the following array of environmental legislation, was to force businesses to internalize some of their
externalities. Six months later, the Nixon administration established the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in order to administer the new regulation and to take over a number of other state
regulatory functions. A year later, Congress passed the 1970 Clean Air Act which was a major
34

Vogel, D. (1989). Fluctuating fortunes: The political power of business in America. New York: Basic Books. P. 59.
Powell, L. (1971). “Confidential Memorandum: Attack on the Free Enterprise System,” Aug. 23, 1971, PowellSydnor Correspondence, Powell Papers, pp. 24-5. For a more extensive examination of the growth of the
th
conservative movement in the 20 century, see: Phillips-Fein, K. (2009). Invisible hands: The making of the
conservative movement from the New Deal to Reagan. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
36
Vogel, D. (1989). Fluctuating fortunes: The political power of business in America. New York: Basic Books. P. 59.
37
Ibid. p. 67.
35

25

change from the 1967 Clean Air Act. It contained firm legislative time times for pollution
abatement of stationary plants and required car companies to reduce vehicular emissions of
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide by 90 percent by 1976. And, two years later, Congress passed
the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments and the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control
Act of 1972.
The legislation flowing out of Congress in the late 1960s and early 1970s dramatically
increased government regulation of business. “Between 1970 and 1975,” explains Vogel,
“expenditures by federal social regulatory agencies increased from $1.5 to $4.3 billion.”38 As
mentioned above, the aim of that regulation was to force business to internalize costs that it had
previously placed on the general public. Between 1970 and 1974, real business spending on air
pollution controls increased by over 150 percent. The total spending on air- and water-pollution in
1974 amounted to 7.7 percent of all capital formation by manufacturing firms. In contrast, in 1969,
total spending on air- and water-pollution controls and occupational safety equipment only amounted to 4
percent of capital formation.39
Concurrent with the new environmental regulation, Congress passed, and Nixon signed into
law, the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The legislation increased the “maximum tax on capital gains,
limited real estate depreciation schedules, eliminated the tax credit for investment, and reduced the
depletion allowance for a number of natural substances, including oil and gas. At the same time, it
provided a modest amount of tax relief for the middle class and the poor.”40 All and all, the tax
reform dramatically shifted the burden of taxation onto business. Indeed, the elimination of the tax
credit alone increased the corporate tax burden by almost $3 billion.41 The New Republic exclaimed
that the 1969 Tax Reform Act “is far and away the most ‘anti-rich’ tax reform proposal ever
proposed by a Republican President in the 56 years of the existence of the income tax.”42
The reaction of business was intense. A survey of 1,844 Harvard Business Review readers
conducted in 1975 revealed that nearly three-quarters were extremely pessimistic about the survival
of America’s commitment to private property and limited government over the next decade. In a
survey of Fortune 500 CEO’s conducted by Fortune in 1976, 28 percent responded that
“government” was the most serious problem faced by their companies and 35 percent stated that
38
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“government” was the most serious problem faced by business in general.”43 Indeed, one executive
explained that “the American capitalist system is confronting its darkest hour.”44
The political loses from 1969 through the mid-1970s motivated business to overcome its
free rider problem and organize to fight against the encroachments of labor and environmentalists in
the political realm. Organize they did. Corporations opened offices in Washington and
exponentially expanded their lobbying activities.45 Additionally, businesses created and expanded
operations in already existing organizations to push collective issues. The Chamber of Commerce
was one of these outlets. Between 1974 and 1980, the Chamber’s membership doubled, and its
budget tripled. The National Federation of Independent Business was another outlet utilized by
business, and, between 1970 and 1979, its membership doubled.46 The Heritage Foundation served
a similar purpose: it was created in 1973 with the intent of “shifting public opinion and policy in a
conservative direction.” The budget of the Heritage Foundation was pumped up through business
donations, and in the early 1980s it was equal in size to that of Brookings Institute.47 In 1972, the
Business Roundtable, an exclusive organization whose membership was only extended to top CEOs,
was created with the purpose of mobilizing “high-level CEOs as a collective force to lobby for the
advancement of shared interests.” By 1977, it “had enlisted 113 of the top Fortune 200 companies,
accounting for nearly half the economy.”48 The Business Roundtable incorporated numerous
advantages. For example, members, who were by requirement CEOs, could utilize company
resources to fulfill taskforce roles delegated to them. More importantly, their members had special
access to government. Thomas Murphy, chairman of GM, Irving Shapiro, chairman of du Pont,
Reginald Jones, chairman of GE, and Clifton Garvin Jr., chairman of the Exxon Corporation were
regular visitors of Jimmy Carter.
Thus business had changed by the mid-1970s. Its individualistic actions of the past had
given way to collective action to promote the group good. “Most of us went our own individual
ways [politically], and when we had problems we addressed them ourselves,” Thomas Murphy
explained of past decades. “I can remember the days when General Motors didn’t have any
43
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Washington activities at all. But because of changing circumstances such as Government regulations
and other Government activities impacting on our business, we find ourselves increasingly
involved.”49
The brief history above highlights the wave of environmental and tax legislation in the late
1960s and early 1970s. The theoretical explanation formalized below assumes that two groups, the
rich and the poor, fight for policy control. The 1969 Nixon Tax Reform Act fits nicely into the
theory. Business and high income earners saw their average tax rates increase and the middle and
lower classes saw their rates decrease. However, did the NEPA and the other environmental
legislation of this period create benefits and costs that homogenously affected business and lower
income groups? Indeed, auto unions allied with car manufacturers to fight environmental legislation
in the mid-1970s. In spite of this, I would argue that a business’s ability or inability to degrade the
environment during the production process fits with the theory formulated below although in a
nuanced manor. Degrading the environment during the production process forces a cost on the
community. At the same time, it creates a benefit for the business that pollutes – a reduction in the
cost of production. The total cost of polluting incurred by all community members might be more
than the benefit enjoyed by the business. Indeed, it often is. However, the total cost the business
incurs from polluting is less than the benefit it enjoys. What essentially is taking place is
redistribution from the community to the polluting business. It is like business is receiving a subsidy
from the government which funded through a tax on the community. While there is the nuance of
low income community members whose jobs might depend on a low cost of production, regulation
of business’s ability to pollute seems to fits with the theoretical explanation formalized below.
Indeed, the creation of regulations that force business to reduce pollutants is like the reduction or
termination of a subsidy for business and the reduction or elimination of the tax on the community
to fund it, all at the same time.
Formalization of Results
Taking from Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), I assume that individuals form two

homogenous groups: rich and poor.50  is the number of rich individuals, and  is the number of
poor individuals. Thus the percent of the population that is rich is:
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The percent of the population that is poor is:







 is the before tax income share of the rich, and 1

  is the before tax income share of

the poor. Both the number of individuals in each income group and their before tax income shares
are assumed to be constant.

There are two state variables: the tax rate, , and the frequency of poor individuals engaging

in political action relative to frequency of rich individuals, . As explained above, individuals engage
in political action because they act on their strong group fairness motive.

is an accounting term of

the relative ability of the poor to overcome their free rider problem. The tax rate is the same for all
citizens, rich and poor, and ranges from zero to one (i.e. (0,1)). Once collected, taxes are

redistributed evenly among all citizens. Thus the after tax income share of the rich, ! , is:
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The first term is income minus taxes due. The second term is the amount of redistribution per
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The first term is income minus taxes due. The second term is the amount of redistribution per
person, 

$

% &#

, times the number of poor people,  , which gives the total amount redistributed to

the poor as a group.
Laws and institutions that affect inequality take place at different points in the production
process. Some laws strengthen employers or employees’ hand before economic activity takes place
and thus affect wages and profits. Other laws and institutions redistribute gains from economic
activity after income has already been distributed. This construction collapses all laws and
institutions that influence distribution, whether or not they operate before or after production, into
one policy, taxation, which impacts distribution after economic activity has taken place. The reason
for this simplification is mathematical tractability. Thus, a tax rate of zero,   0, is shorthand for
the specific configuration of laws and institutions that best slants gains from economic activity to
the rich. A tax rate of one hundred percent,   1, which equalizes after tax income between all

citizens, is meant to represent the specific configuration of laws and institutions that most empower
the poor.

I assume that the change in the tax rate, (, is only a function of :
(  ) 

(5)

The relative frequency of poor individuals engaging in political action is positively related to ( (i.e.
*(

*+

 0). This is because an increase in

increases the relative amount of resources the poor

dedicate to political action thus shifting the forces mustered in the poor’s favor.
I assume that the change in relative frequency of poor individuals engaging in political

action, ( , is only a function of the level of redistribution, :
(  ,

(6)

*
The tax rate, , is negatively related to ( (i.e. *$ - 0). This is because an increase in the tax rate will
(

increase the frequency of rich individuals engaging in political action and decrease it among the
poor. This will decrease . Likewise, a decrease in the tax rate will decrease solidarity among the
rich and increase it among the poor. This will increase relative solidarity of the poor.
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Solving the model
Because of its symmetry, the model can be solved explicitly.51 Figure 2.1 shows the results
*+(

*(

of equation (5) and (6) and assumptions *$ - 0 and  0 in the  ,  plane. Starting in the
*+
upper right quadrant of the graph, the high and increasing level of redistribution threatens the rich
and motivates them to mobilize. The familiar problems of free riding and public goods dynamics
are swept aside and the resources gathered by the rich for political contestation surge. The
horizontal arrow in the upper right quadrant of the graph represents the mobilization of the rich
relative to the poor. Otherwise said, it shows that
Once



/

is decreasing in this quadrant (i.e. that ( - 0).

(this occurs along the (  0 locus), the resources mobilized by each group for the

political fight lead to a stalemate. Redistribution doesn’t change.

51

Algebraic manipulation of equations (5) and (6) yield:
,

0$
01

 ) 

0+

(7)

01

All of the terms in equation (7) are functions of time, t. Thus, we can integrate both sides of the equation over
time. Doing so, followed by a change of variables, yields:
2 ,3  2 ) 3

(8)

Equation (8) can be explicitly solved. Now let us define 4, :
4,   5 6  (9)

5 is equal to the integration of , over . Likewise, 6  is equal to the integration of )  over . C is
equal to B minus A and thus is also constant. The properties below follow from the definition of 4, :
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As a result of (10) through (13), it follows that:




4,  is convex
4,  has a global minimum in the stationary equilibrium and that 4$  4+  0 holds at equilibrium
Starting from some initial point other than the equilibrium, the path of ,  will follow level curves
corresponding to the constant C (which is determined by the initial values of < and < ).
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Tax Rate, T

Figure 1.1 – The evolution of solidarity and political control
(  0

( 0

Relative Solidarity of the Poor, ϴ

Although not changing, the tax rate is still high enough to mobilize the rich relative to the
poor (i.e.

is still decreasing). This development pushes

into the upper left quadrant of the

graph. In this quadrant, the relative mobilization of the rich is such that they are able to capture the
political system and gradually shift laws and institutions in their favor. The vertical arrow in the
upper left quadrant shows that the level of redistribution is decreasing (i.e. ( - 0). As the rich

continue to decrease T, and, as inequality grows, the relative position of the poor is undercut again
and again. These dynamics push the system into the bottom left quadrant of the graph.
In this quadrant things are completely reversed from what they were in the upper right
quadrant. The low level of redistribution and thus high degree of economic inequality threaten the
poor and motivate them to mobilize. The familiar problems of free riding and public goods
dynamics are swept aside and the resources gathered by the poor for political contestation surge.
The horizontal arrow in the lower left quadrant of the graph represents the mobilization of the poor
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relative to the rich. Otherwise said, it shows that

is increasing in this quadrant. Once



/

, the

resources mobilized by each group for the political fight lead to a stalemate. The level of
redistribution doesn’t change.
As before, although not changing, the tax rate is low enough to mobilize the poor relative to
the rich, i.e.

continues to increase. This development pushes

into the lower right quadrant of

the graph. In this quadrant, the poor are relatively more mobilized than the rich and thus are able to
take control of the political system and slant laws more and more in their favor. The vertical arrow

in the lower right quadrant shows that the level of redistribution is increasing (i.e. (  0). As these
developments continue, the system is pushed back into the upper right quadrant, and the cycle
begins anew. Figure 2 breaks down the results explained above and graphs the relative frequency of
poor individuals engaging in political action, the tax rate, and the income share of the rich over time.
Conclusion
Thus the answer to the paradox presented in the beginning of the paper is that our
democratic system is more complicated than just voting. In order for a group to successfully push
its cause in the political area, it needs to act collectively. However, political action for a group good
is plagued by the free-rider problem. To overcome the free-rider problem, individuals must act on
their group regarding preferences. However, the actions that result from the group regarding
preferences of one group lead to the activation of the very same preferences among individuals in
the other group and their political ascendance. As a result, government policy oscillates between
pro-rich and pro-poor. In turn, inequality oscillates from relatively high to relatively low when
policy is pro-rich and pro-poor, respectively.
It should be reiterated that this model only seeks to explain the general trend in economic
inequality and the orientation of laws in institutions in the United States and thus leaves out many
important issues. For example, race and sectional issues are not examined. This is a serious
omission when talking about politics, laws and institutions, and inequality. Indeed, the political
realignments starting in the late 1860s and those of the 1960s involved huge racial components. In
the early period, the banner of white supremacy played a large role in goading poor white
southerners, many of which originally supported the Radical Republican party, into the Democratic
party’s conservative embrace. In the latter period, the federal government’s reaction to the race
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question in the South played a role in activating new Republicanism.52 Thus, one should not forget
that the model is a stylized version of history, and in the process of making such a stylized
presentation possible certain factors are left out.
However, some historical developments which might seem incongruent with the model can
be explained with a little nuance. The Progressive and the New Era are the best example of such.
From 1900 to 1920, Progressives pushed through an impressive number of liberal laws. Indeed, the
current income tax was passed in 1913 via amendment to the Constitution over the Supreme Court’s
1895 decision, and in 1916, 1917, and 1919 surtax rates on those at the upper reaches of the income
ladder were increased.53 During the New Era which spanned the 1920s, the many arms of
government worked tirelessly to slant the playing fields back in big business’s favor. “Never
before,” explained the Wall Street Journal in 1925, “here or anywhere else has a government been so
completely fused with business.” And the President himself was not shy in agreeing: “This is a
business country,” explained Calvin Coolidge, “and it wants a business government.”54 Thus, at first
glance, the shift in laws and institutions to benefit middle and low income groups during the
Progressive Era and then abrupt shift back during the New Era doesn’t fit well with the conservative
nature of cycles which result from the model presented above.
However, the Progressive impulse was exactly the political activation of liberal individuals
stemming from group regarding preferences explained in the paper. Indeed, one of the leading
historians on the Progressive Era, Richard Hofstadter explains the movement as resulting from the
change in distribution of wealth and power that took place in the end of the 19th century. “In a
strictly economic sense,” explains Hofstadter, “these men [the Progressives] were not growing
poorer as a class, but their wealth and power were being dwarfed by comparison with the new
eminences of wealth and power.” The Progressives saw this as a result of government policy and
sought to right it by changing laws and institutions. 55 The abrupt shift back in the 1920s seems to
52
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be a result of the extreme repression of liberal thought during and directly after World War I and the
nature of the Progressives themselves. A middle class movement, the Progressives never completely
embraced labor. While they distrusted the very rich, they also did not completely trust those below
them. Thus, when President Woodrow Wilson needed support for his war policies, he leaned to the
right instead of the left and destroyed the very liberal base that was holding him in power. Indeed,
in 1920, Progressive Senator Hiram Johnson of California explained to the press that “The war has
set back the people for a generation. They have bowed to a hundred repressive acts... They are
docile; and they will not recover from being so for many years. The interests which control the
Republican Party will make the most of their docility.”56 And they did during the 1920s. This
dynamic is not inconsistent with the model presented above. Indeed, it can be explained in a less
colorful manor as an exogenous increase in the perceived cost of political action for liberal groups.
A similar nuance can explain the Taft-Hartley Act. Becoming law in 1947 during a period of
relative labor empowerment, Taft-Hartley moved in the opposite direction of New Deal legislation
by prohibiting certain union actions. However, it seems that the act was a result of the growing
external pressure stemming from the Cold War. “[T]he Reds, phonies and 'parlor pinks' seem to be
banded together,” wrote President Harry Truman in his diary in September 1946, “and are becoming
a national danger. I am afraid they are a sabotage front for Uncle Joe Stalin.” At the same time, the
nature of the Taft-Hartley Act should not be exaggerated. While it curbed communist influence in
labor organizations and politics, it did not roll back the Wagner Act or shunt labor’s position in
government. 57
Thus despite what is left out and the need to add nuance to explain certain historical
developments, this explanation is in general accord with the evolution of both economic inequality
and the orientation of laws and institutions in the United States. Indeed, it is in much better
harmony with US experience than other explanations that take aim at similar questions.
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For example, in their 2001 paper, “A Theory of Political Transitions,” Daron Acemoglu and
James Robinson predict that in a consolidated democracy, which presumably includes the United
States, the rich and the poor settle into a stable Pareto optimal outcome and, as a result, are able to
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avoid political oscillations, changes in laws and institutions, and fluctuations in economic
inequality.58 Instead, we know that inequality, political control, and laws and institutions have
fluctuated inside a “consolidated democracy.”
To be sure, the explanation presented here is in accord with a large body of historical work.
For example, in their book Winner-Take-All Politics, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson explain the
secular increase in economic inequality since the late 1970s as the result of those at the upper
reaches of the income ladder capturing policy control. Another example of historical work which
supports the arguments in this paper is Kim Phillips-Fein’s book, Invisible Hands. In the book,
Phillips-Fein meticulously documents the growth in conservative movements from the beginning of
the New Deal to Ronald Regan’s Presidency. In the model presented above, this is the same as an
increase in the activation of group regarding preferences among the rich and thus an increase in
solidarity between them. As hypothesized here, this development took place during a period where,
in general, laws and institutions favored the rich less and less. At the same time, Phillips-Fein’s work
highlights how difficult it would be to calculate actual values for ϴ over time. Indeed, even
calculating values for T would be difficult. First of all, as has been mentioned above, the
adjudication of laws and management of institutions changes over time. Thus there could be no
changes in laws passed by Congress but a complete change in the orientation of preexisting laws and
institutions. The major development in labor law from 1877 to the end of the 1920s was completely
juridical in nature. Probably more of a barrier to measurement, the redistributive nature, or lack
thereof, of many laws and institutions is difficult to quantify. At the same time, although T and ϴ
might be difficult to measure numerically, the theory can be tested against history.
Thus what should one take from this paper? There are two main things. First, this paper is
not meant to exclude the possibility of other mechanisms like skill biased technological change
(SBTC) or power biased technological change (PBTC).59
Instead its purpose is to construct a case for another mechanism. Testing the importance of
the different theories is a job for the future. Second, this paper highlights a dynamic which doesn’t
seem to be as marked or even existent in other developed democracies from the mid-20th century to
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present.60 Thus it opens up questions about the comparative nature of our democratic system: How
is the US political system different from political systems in other developed democratic countries?
How does this difference enable the dynamic outlined in this paper in the United States and mute or
eliminate it in other developed democracies?
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CHAPTER 2
INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE LATE
1860S
Introduction
Understanding income inequality is a central issue in economics and politics. However,
there are still may questions left open. Is income inequality driven by different rates of change in
technology that accompanies high and low skilled labor? Is inequality a result of changing
institutions that frame the economic playing field? In order to answer any of these questions, it is
important to develop data to test these and other theories. Much work has been done with data
from the current income tax. However, data from the Civil War income tax, the first income tax in
the history of the United States, which spanned from 1862 to 1871 has been underutilized. Creating
national and city level statistics for this period would be valuable for extending our understanding of
income inequality in the United States and potentially shinning some light on the bigger questions
highlighted above.
Lee Soltow is the exception to the statement above. He uses Civil War income tax data on
the frequency of self-reported incomes within five different income groups ($1,001+, $1,401+,
$2,001+, $3,001+, and $11,001+) to estimate the inverse-Pareto curve for the income distribution of
the whole country.61 Soltow then compares his calculations for the late 1860s and early 1870s with
similar statistics from the current income tax and concludes that inequality was greater during the
Civil War decade than during the decade encompassing World War I. However, his analysis is
problematic. To estimate the inverse-Pareto curve, Soltow uses five data points. Thus, Soltow is
assuming that these handful of data points, which only comprise about two percentiles of the
income distribution, are characteristic of the rest. It is entirely possible that uncovering new data
could yield a much flatter Pareto slope and completely change his conclusions. In this paper, I
61
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reexamine the data Soltow used to calculate the inverse-Pareto curve and bring in other data from
the Reports of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the Civil War income tax to calculate the
income share of the top one percent of tax units in 1866, 1867, and 1868. As we shall see, my
calculations leads to completely different conclusions than those found by Soltow opening up
questions about how we understand the relationship between income inequality and the orientation
of laws and institutions.
In addition, I analyze new income tax data from newspaper and other private publications to
calculate the share of total income accruing to the top 1, 0.1, and 0.01 percent of the population in
New York City and Philadelphia for 1863 and 1868 and 1864 to 1866, respectively. As we shall see,
in accordance with Kuznets’ findings, income inequality in two of the United States’ premier urban
centers was much higher than it was at the national level. Interestingly, the shares of the top one
percent in New York City in the 1860s and right before the Great Recession are comparably high.
Furthermore, analysis of city level data also supports the theory that income inequality fell
dramatically during the 1860s.
The paper is laid out as follows: in the first section of the paper, I provide a brief history of
the Civil War income tax. In the second section, I go through the calculation of the income share of
the top one percent of tax units at the national level and explicitly describe the different assumption
made due to data problems. In the third section, I talk about the reliability of the data gleamed from
newspaper publications. In the fourth and fifth sections, I explore the taxable income data for New
York City and Philadelphia for 1863 and 1868 and 1864 to 1866, respectively. In the six section, I
estimate incomes for non-income tax paying head of household residents to allow the calculation of
income shares for those at the upper reaches of the income ladder in section six. In the seventh
section, I look at tax fraud to establish the comparability of the statistics calculated here and those
for the 20th and 21st century, and, in the last section, I compare the statistics with those from the
current income tax and talk about the importance of the findings.
A short history of the Civil War income tax
On July 1, 1862, President Lincoln signed the Internal Revenue Act of the same year which
instituted a tax on individuals’ incomes – the first ever put into operation by the federal government
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of the United States.62 The tax was levied on all “gains, profits, or income of every person residing
in the United States, whether derived from any kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, salaries,
or from any profession, trade, employment, or vocation carried on in the United States or elsewhere,
or from any other source whatever.” Income greater than $600 and less than or equal to $10,000
was taxed at three percent, and income over $10,000 was taxed at five percent.63
The tax was collected in different ways for different types of employment and different
sources of income. For civil, military, and naval personnel, taxes were deducted before income was
disbursed to the individual.64 This was also the case for all income derived from interest, coupons,
and dividends from all banks, trust companies, savings institutions, insurance companies, and
railroads. And, in 1864, canal, turnpike, canal navigation, and slack water companies were added to
this list. For non-governmental salaries and income not derived from dividends, interest, and
coupons of the above mentioned sources, individuals were responsible for reporting income lists to
the internal revenue officer of their collection district. As not to tax individuals twice, self-reporting
taxpayers were allowed to deduct incomes that were taxed by different portions of the same law.
Thus incomes from interest, dividends, and coupons of the above mentioned sources were not retaxed when individuals self-reported. At the same time, the amendatory act of 1863 enabled
individuals to deduct the amount paid for rent from taxable income, and the revenue act of 1864
extended this provision to allow homeowners to estimate what rent would be and deduct it from
their taxable income.65
Calculation of National Statistic
We can use data from the Civil War income tax and from other sources to calculate the
percent of total income accruing to the top one percent of tax units in 1866, 1867, and 1868. The
formula is as follows:
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While the mathematics are simple, there are some data problems. As a result, there are a
number of assumptions that have to be made to calculate the statistic. Thus, in this section, I will
explain them explicitly. As we will see, the statistics that results should be viewed as an upper bound
estimation of the income share of the top one percent of tax units.
Let’s start by looking at the numerator. During the Civil War income tax, adult males,
defined as twenty years or more of age, were required to report their income and that earned by
dependent children and spouse. Thus a tax unit represented an adult male and all of his dependents.
We can calculate the number of tax units that make up the top one percent by estimating the adult
male population. There are census figures for the adult male population in 1860 and 1870. 66
However, there are no statistics for the years in between. I estimate these values by stringing
together a linear trend between the data points for 1860 and 1870. This is an approximation of
reality. Most likely the linear trend overestimates the number of adult males during the middle of
the decade due to war casualties and the decrease in immigration. To the degree that the linear
estimation does overestimate the size of the adult male population during the years in question, the
statistics for the number of tax units in the top one percent would be upwardly biased thus
attributing more income to the group. As a result, the income share statistic would also be biased
upwards.
Once we establish the number of tax units that make up the top one percent, we need to
calculate their total income. As mentioned above, collection of income tax was separated into two
groups depending on the source of income and types of employment. For some incomes, taxes
were collected at the source like those deriving from dividends, interest, and coupons from banks,
railroads, and insurance, canal, turnpike, canal navigation, and slack water companies. For other
sources, income was self-reported and paid by the individual. In terms of self-reported income, we
have aggregate data on the total amount of revenue collected for income in 1866 through 1868.
This data can be easily manipulated to give the total amount returned for assessment during the
different calendar years by dividing by the tax rate.67 However, these figures approximately
66
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represent the total self-reported income of the top three percent of the adult male population – the
percent of all US adult males that paid income tax during this period.68 In order to calculate the total
self-reported income of the top one percent of tax units, we need to subtract out the 97th and 98th
percentile from the aggregate figures. There is some data, but very little, on the number of
individual in different income groups. Luckily, of the little data that exists, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue of the Civil War income tax compiled figures which nicely delineate the 97th and
98th percentile from the 99th percentile for 1866, 1867, and 1868.69 We can use this data to
manipulate aggregate figures such that they only include the total self-reported income of the top
one percent of adult males.70 This series is displayed in the first row of table 1. As we can see, the
total self-reported nominal income of the top one percent of tax units fell in 1867 and increase in
1868 but not by enough to make up for the previous year. On average, it hovered around $542
million (in current dollars).
In terms of income from dividends, interest, and coupons from banks, railroads, insurance
companies, and other transportation companies there is aggregate data for the total amount
collected during the different fiscal years.71 Because of the non-synchronization of collection after
the act of 1867, the total amount collected during a given fiscal year represents part of income
reported for assessment in the previous calendar year and part of the income reported for
assessment in the same calendar year. Unlike the case of self-reported income data, there are not
exact figures for the total revenue collected from income for different calendar years. If we assume
a given fiscal year represents the corresponding calendar year, we could under or over represent the
amount of income accruing to the top one percent from this source and thus downwardly or
upwardly bias the income share statistic for that year. At the same time, the degree to which making
68

The percent of all adult males paying income tax fluctuated between 2.93, 2.75, 2.89, and 2.87 percent in 1866,
1867, 1868, and 1869 respectively.
69
th
th
th
For data on number of individuals with incomes in the 97 , 98 , and 99 , see United States. (1868-70). Report of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the operations of the Internal Revenue system for the year ending.
Washington: G.P.O. or see Hill, J. A. (July 01, 1894). THE CIVIL WAR INCOME TAX. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 8, 4.) Appendix P. 494. Adult males with income over $2,000 represented the top 1.06, 1.06, 1.01, and
0.98 percent of the adult male population in 1866, 1867, 1868, and 1869 respectively.
70
th
th
This is done by subtracting the middle income from two income ranges which make up the 97 and 98
percentiles and multiplying those by the total number of adult males which populate each range. From this, one
small correction is needed. Each tax unit was allowed to deduct $1,000 in 1866 through 1869. Thus, in order to
estimate their total income instead of their total taxable income, $1,000 has to be added for each tax unit.
71
For data on number of income deriving from dividends, interest, and coupons from banks, railroads, and
insurance companies, see United States. (1868-72). Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the
operations of the Internal Revenue system for the year ending. Washington: G.P.O. or see Hill, J. A. (July 01, 1894).
THE CIVIL WAR INCOME TAX. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 8, 4.) Appendix Pp. 491-2.

43

such an assumption would bias one statistic, it would have the opposite effect on the statistic for an
adjacent year. Any income that was falsely attributed to one year would have to come from one of
the adjacent years. Consequently, the income share statistic for the adjacent year would then be
biased in the opposite direction. The average over a number of years would somewhat self correct.
As a result, let us assume that a given fiscal year represents the corresponding calendar year. As we
can see from table 1, this assumption leads to very similar income share statistics for the three years.
Thus it seems that the amount of income missing from a given fiscal year that should be attributed
to the corresponding calendar year is offset by a similar amount of income included from the
following calendar year.
There is one more problem with dividend, interest, and coupon income. Unlike selfreported statistics, there is no way to identify what part of that income accrues to the top one
percent and what part belongs to the bottom 99 percent. In order to calculate a first approximation,
we can assume that all income deriving from dividends, interest, and coupons from banks, railroads,
insurance companies, and other transportation companies accrued to the top one percent of tax
units. This clearly overestimates the total income of the top one percent and thus biases income
share statistic upwards. Thus we should take final statistics for the income share of the top one
percent of tax units as an upper bound. The result is displayed in second row in table 1. As we can
see, the amount of income from dividends, interest, and coupons increased steadily from $168
million in 1866 to $191 million in 1868.
We can now calculate the numerator which is just the sum of the total amount of selfreported income and income collected at the source accruing to the top one percent. This series is
displayed in the third row from the top in table 1. As we can see, total nominal income of the top
one percent fell from $738 million in 1866 to $684 million in 1867. However, in 1868, the total
income of the top one percent increased sufficiently to bring it just about to where it was in 1866.
In order to calculate the denominator, we need a statistics for nominal gross domestic
product (GDP). GDP was not explicitly calculated by the government before the 1930s. However,
Louis Johnston and Samuel Williamson have constructed nominal GDP figures for the 1860s.72
Johnston and Williamson use interpolation between Robert Gallman’s figures for 1859 and 1869 to
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calculate figures for 1866, 1867, and 1868.73 Their results are shown in the fourth row in table 1. As
we can see, nominal GDP decreased between 1866 and 1868. This was a result of deflation.
Indeed, during this period, real GDP increased by 5.7 percent.74
Table 2.1: Construction of income share of top 1% of tax units (current dollars)
Self-reported income + $1,000
deduction (millions)
Income from dividends, interest, and
coupons (millions)
Total income (millions)
GDP (millions)
Income share of top 1%
Source: see text.

1866
$570

1867
$500

1868
$544

$168

$184

$191

$738
$9,081
8.13%

$684
$8,424
8.12%

$735
$8,224
8.93%

The income share of the top one percent of tax units was 8.13 percent of total income in
1866 and 8.12 percent in 1867. In 1869, the income share increased marginally to 8.93 percent of
total income. During the three years, the average income share of the top one percent was 8.39
percent of total income.
Before we can compare the statistics calculate here to Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez’s
data on income shares of top earners during the 20th and 21st century, three small points have to be
made. Also, we have to talk about tax fraud. First, salaries of federal government employees are not
included in the statistics calculated here. They were collected at the source and thus not included in
self-reported incomes. At the same time, there is no data on the distribution of the incomes of such
individuals. The inability to include federal government employees in the calculation doesn’t seem
to be a significant problem. The federal government was much smaller during this period, and the
increase in federal employment due to the Civil War had been largely reverted by the end of 1865.
Indeed, in 1865, federal employment decreased so dramatically such that total federal wages fell by
at least 72 percent.75 Furthermore, it is unlikely that federal wages made up a significant portion of
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income for the top one percent. To the extent that they represented part of the income arruing to
the bottom 99 percent, they are included in the GDP statistics. Second, only capital gains from
assets held less than three years are included in self-assessments. Thus this series is awkwardly in the
middle of Piketty and Saez’s data which neatly includes and excludes capital gains. Third, individuals
who owned their house were allowed to estimate what rent would be and deduct it from their
income. This factor definitely downwardly biases the statistics. However, it is likely that the upward
biases talked about above are larger. Thus these three points are small and likely do not significantly
reduce comparability with Piketty and Saez’s statistics. More important is the relative level of tax
fraud during the Civil War income tax. However, before we talk about tax fraud, lets look at income
inequality in New York City and Philadelphia during the 1860s.
Reliability of data for New York City and Philadelphia
Besides the aggregate data from the Reports of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, there
is also a plethora of data for reported taxable income for tax units in a number of cities.
Newspapers and other private venues literally published pages of lists with individuals’ names and
their reported taxable income. I have uncovered and coded data for New York City and
Philadelphia residents for 1863 and 1868 and 1864 to 1866, respectively. However, one must ask if
this data is reliable? Did data published in newspapers and other private venues accurately represent
data collected by the Internal Revenue Service? To answer this question, let us explore
contemporary commentary to understand why income lists were published in private venues.
“One curious feature of Federal experience with … [the income] tax,” explained David
Wells, who Congress appointed in 1865 to a commission of three to investigate the federal tax
system, “was, that the returns made under it were thrown open to the public.” This was not
legislated by Congress, but instead was decided by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the
absence of legislation prohibiting such actions. Indeed, “one commissioner of internal revenue
instructed his officials to have [returns]… published in the pages of local papers.” 76 These actions
were defended on the grounds that they helped detect fraud. “The publication of the income lists,
although it has raised a great deal of indignation,” argued the New York Times in 1865, “is yet
approved by the mass of all upright loyal men who do not desire to see their Government, now in
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its day of trouble, defrauded of great.”77 “The object of the law,” explained Commissioner Joseph
Lewis in 1865, “seems to have been to afford every tax-payer an opportunity of ascertaining what
returns his neighbors have made.” “He is interested in these returns,” Lewis explained, “because the
burden of the national duties is a common one, and every person should be required to pay his due
proportion of it.”78 Publication of incomes reduced fraud through two mechanisms. First, it
enlisted the masses to act as internal revenue police. Second, it created social pressure to conform
to the law by opening up those who underreported to public shaming. “Why shun the light if there
be nothing that dreads it?” asked the New York Tribune, “And if there be men living at the rate of
five to ten thousand a year who swear their incomes down to $1,000 or $1,500, why not let the
world see and scorn their unpatriotic knavery?”79 Indeed, those who fraudulently reported income
were often called out in the press. “One man, who was supposed to have an income of over
$100,000 from unencumbered real estate,” commented the Evening Post, “lives like an English
nobleman on about $2,800 per year, and another supports a luxurious town house and country place
on the prodigious income of $98.02, from which is to be deducted the sum of $2.94 for his bleeding
country.” “Such thrift and executive capacity,” the Post added, “are unsurpassed in ancient or
modern times; and they place many of our fellow-citizens high above that celebrated individual of
antiquity who was flaying a parasite for his oleaginous deposit and cuticle.”80 This practice continued
until it was explicitly prohibited by Congress in 1870.81
While unusual compared to current practices, publication of reported taxable income was a
feature of the Civil War income tax. Thus it seems that we can reasonably assume that income lists
published by private venues accurately represented those lists compiled by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Indeed, as David Wells describes, the bureau officers themselves sometimes saw to it that
reported taxable income lists were published in private venues.
New York City 1863 and 1868
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In 1865, the American News Company published a list of the reported taxable income for
“every resident of New York [City]” for the year of 1863; and, in 1869, the New York Tribune
published the same list but for the year of 1868. In both cases, the data was taken from the archives
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. During these years, New York City made up the fourth, fifth,
sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and thirty second collection districts of the state of New York. In table
two, I compile the data from these two sources and report the number of individuals in nine
different income categories for each year. In 1863, reported taxable incomes range from $1 dollars
to $1,843,637. The latter income was that of Alexander T. Stewart – owner of the largest dry good
store in the United States. William B. Astor reported an income of $838,525. Cornelius Vanderbilt
reported a taxable income of $680,728, and Moses Taylor reported a taxable income of $573,494.
The mean taxable income was a little more than $4,000. The median taxable income was a little less
than $1,000, and the total taxable income was just over $82 million. 17,936 people reported a
taxable income of around 160,000 head of household New Yorkers.82 Thus those that fell under the
income tax in 1863 roughly represented the top 11 percent of all head of household New York City
residents.
In 1868, taxable incomes range from $1 dollars to $3,019,281. The latter income is that of
Alexander T. Stewart which represents a 63.8 percent increase on his reported taxable income in
1863. William B. Astor reported a taxable income of $1,079,212 which represents a 28.7 percent
increase from 1863. In 1868, the mean taxable income was a little less than $5,000.83 The median
taxable income was greater than $1,000, and the total taxable income was slightly more than $88
million. 17,991 people reported a taxable income of around 180,000 head of household New
Yorkers.84 Thus those that fell under the income tax in 1868 roughly represented the top 10 percent
of all head of household New York City residents. As mentioned above, only the top three percent
of adult males paid the income tax at the national level in 1868. Thus, New York City already
represented a disproportion concentration of upper incomes.
From 1863 to 1868, the mean and median taxable income increased slightly although median
taxable income increased more. Because of the increase in exemptions, this increase
underrepresents the total increase in mean and median income for those paying the income tax.
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Total taxable income increased by seven percent between 1863 and 1868. As with mean and median
income, this figure understates the change in total income for New Yorkers paying income tax as a
result of the increase in income exempted from the income tax. Also, while total taxable income in
1868 represents a smaller percentage of all head of household New Yorker City residents, there were
a larger absolute number of people paying the income tax.
Table 2.2: Number of New Yorkers with Taxable Incomes
1863

1868

Below $1,000
Over $1,000 and less than $5,000

9765
5490

8610
5701

Over $5,000 and less than $10,000
Over $10,000 and less than $20,000

1245
692

1885
1005

Over $20,000 and less than $50,000
Over $50,000 and less than $100,000

477
191

531
194

Over $100,000 and less than $500,000
Over $500,000 and less than $1,000,000

71
4

62
0

1
17936

2
17990

Over $1,000,000
Total
Source: see text
Philadelphia 1864 through 1866

In 1865, a John Trenwith circulated a list of the reported taxable income for “the rich men
of Philadelphia” for the year of 1864;85 and, in 1867, he published a list for the year of 1865 and
1866. In both cases, the data was taken from the archives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
During these years, Philadelphia made up the first through fifth district of the state of Pennsylvania.
In table three, I compile the data for the three years and report the number of individuals in nine
different income categories for each year. In 1864, reported taxable incomes range from $1 dollars
to $616,817. The latter income was that of Simon W. Arnold. The next two largest incomes after
Arnold’s were those of J. Gillingham Fell and George F. Tyler reporting a taxable income of
$398,550 and $359,400, respectively. The interesting aspect of this data is the difference between
Philadelphia’s largest earners and New York City’s. It points to a significant regional inequality
85
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between New York City and Philadelphia and potentially the rest of the country. However, for now,
we will leave this issue aside. The mean taxable income was about $3,500. The median taxable
income was a little less than $1,000, and the total taxable income was almost $69 million. 19,116
people reported a taxable income of around 152,000 head of household Philadelphia residents.86
Thus those that fell under the income tax in 1864 roughly represented the top 12.5 percent of all
head of household residents.
In 1865, taxable incomes range from $5 dollars to $274,080. The latter income is that of J.
Gillingham Fell which represents a 45.4 percent decrease on his reported taxable income in 1864.
The second highest income was that of Clayton French who reported an income of $187,139,87 and
the third largest income was that of William Sellers who reported a taxable income of $162,390.
Seller also reported a decrease in income between 1864 and 1865. However, his income only fell by
9.6 percent. The mean taxable income was a little more than $4,000. The median taxable income
was around $1,500, and the total taxable income was slightly more than $32 million. Only 8,029
people reported a taxable income of around 155,000 head of household Philadelphia residents.
Thus those that fell under the income tax in Philadelphia in 1865 represented a little more than five
percent of all head of household residents.
In 1866, taxable incomes range from $1 dollars to $208,276. The latter income is that of J.
Gillingham Fell which represents a 24 percent decrease on his reported taxable income in 1865. The
second highest income was that of H.C. Gibson who reported an income of $166,840 which
represented a 61.2 percent increase on his reported taxable income in 1865. As in 1865, the third
largest was that of William Sellers who reported a taxable income of $151,989. Seller’s taxable
income fell slightly in 1866 but only by 6.4 percent. The mean taxable income was a little less than
$3,000. The median taxable income was almost $1,000, and the total taxable income was slightly
more than $36 million. 12,377 people reported a taxable income of around 158,000 head of
household Philadelphia residents. Thus those that fell under the income tax in 1866 represented
almost eight percent of all head of household residents. As a result, Philadelphia also represented a
city which had a concentration of high incomes – but not to the same extent as New York City.
Table 2.3: Number of Philadelphia Residents with Taxable Incomes
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1864

1865

1866

Below $1,000

10576

2921

6513

Over $1,000 and less than $5,000

5973

3661

4162

Over $5,000 and less than $10,000
Over $10,000 and less than $20,000

1289
696

780
411

971
475

Over $20,000 and less than $50,000
Over $50,000 and less than $100,000

439
107

189
47

198
58

Over $100,000 and less than $500,000
Over $500,000 and less than $1,000,000

35
0

20
0

10
0

1
19116

0
8029

0
12387

Over $1,000,000
Total
Source: see text

Average income of non-income tax paying New York City and Philadelphia Residents
Only a small portion of the population paid the Civil War income tax. Thus, we cannot
calculate income shares for New York City and Philadelphia in the 1860s unless we estimate the
average yearly income of head of household residents that did not pay income tax. To do this, I will
utilize the “The House of Representatives Report on the Statistics of Wages in Manufacturing
Industries” compiled by Joseph D. Weeks – more commonly known as the Weeks report.88 This
report was created as a part of the 1880 census. It contains data on nominal wages by industry, job,
and city which go back to 1840. It is important to note that Weeks data has well-known and
documented problems like geographical bias, lack of specific information on worker, and small
sample size before 1850.89 However, a good number of these issues do not matter for this study.
Indeed, the oversampling of New York City, Philadelphia, and the Northeast in general allow for a
more accurate picture of the two cities in question here. Furthermore, because we are interested in
the average income of those that did not make enough to pay income tax, firm level averages of
daily wages are just as good as individual specific wages. Finally, the small sample size before 1850 is
not important for the current study because we are interested in the 1860s.
At the same time, the Weeks report only includes data on the manufacturing sector and thus
misses a significant part of both New York City and Philadelphia’s economy. For New York City
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during the 1860s, the Weeks report includes data on low income jobs in the cigars and tobacco,
furniture, pianos and organs, and carriage and wagon works sectors. These sectors include such jobs
as stripper, laborer, varnisher, finisher, upholsterer, cabinet-maker, packer, case-maker, body-maker,
engineer, trimmer, machinist, and painter. For Philadelphia during the 1860s, the Weeks report
includes data on low income jobs in the stove foundery, carpets, cotton manufacture, hats, furniture,
car-works, brick-making, and glass industries. These industries include such jobs as stove-backer,
sheet-iron worker, cleaner, engineer, laborer, melter, molder, carder, folder, picker, grinder, weaver,
trimmer, varnisher, packer, carter, driver, and watchman. Without a doubt, these were not the only
jobs occupied by those at the bottom rungs of the income ladder. Because we want to construct an
average income series for those that did not pay income tax, this represents a limitation. However,
this limitation is not as large as it may initially seem. The wages paid to those in the lowest rung of
manufacturing jobs were most likely similar to the wages paid to those in the lowest rung of other
industries. In both sectors, these jobs would have required little or no skill and thus were most likely
interchangeable. Indeed, it is probable that wages for the lowest rung in different industries were
comparable.
Keeping these limitations in mind, I compile a city specific series for the average yearly
income of head of household non-income tax paying residents in New York City and Philadelphia
using the Weeks report. The results are depicted in figure 1. Each series only includes data from
jobs that received such a low remuneration as to exempt the individuals from paying the income
tax.90 I assume that the average work year is 312 days per year. This represents working six days a
week for 52 weeks and is clearly an upper bound. Work years were often less than 52 full weeks for
a number of reasons. In times of economic downturn or because of seasonality of work, laborers
could be thrown out of work for a number of weeks. Additionally, the length of the workday and
physical nature of work in the lowest class often forced workers to take time off because of
exhaustion. Thus, in the following section, I will analyze the sensitivity of income shares to variation
in the work year of those that did not pay income tax.

Figure 2.1: Average Yearly Income of Non-Income Tax Paying Head of Household
Residents

90

These are the jobs listed above.
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Source: see text.
As we can see, average yearly nominal income of non-income tax paying head of household
New York City and Philadelphia residents ticked upward as the decade progressed. However, this
should be taken in the context of a very large increase in the price level. Indeed, in 1869, the New
York Times carried out a study on prices in the city and concluded that the price level had increased
by 90 percent since 1860.91 And, in a study utilizing price data from the Weeks report, Philip Coelho
and James Shepherd (1976) find similar results for the entire Northeast.92 At the same time, it
should be kept in mind that these series are defined by workers that did not pay income tax.
Because the minimum exemption changed over time, movements in the average incomes series in
figure 1 represent changes in both jobs included in the series and changes in the remuneration of
specific jobs. In regards to the former, in 1868 the minimum exemption increased from $600 to
$1,000 thus increasing the number of jobs with such a low remuneration as to exempt individuals in
such jobs from paying the income tax.
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Figure 2.2 - Income Shares of the top 1, 0.1, and 0.01 percent in New York City in 1863 and
1868
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Income Shares of Top Earners
In figure 2, I display income shares for the top 1, 0.1, and 0.01 percent of New York City
head of householders for 1863 and 1868. As we can see, in 1863, tthe
he top 1 percent in New York
City received 32.4 percent of total income. The top 0.1 percent received 13 percent of total income,
and the top 0.01 percent, the 16 individuals with the largest incomes in New York City, received 4.4
percent of total income. As noted above, the assumption that those not paying income tax labored
for 312 days per year is an upper bound for the work year. Weakening the assumption would
decrease the income of those at the bottom and thus increase the share
shares of those at the top. For
example, assuming an average work year of 290 days would increase the share
shares of the top 1, 0.1, and
0.01 percent in New York City by 1.1, 0.5, and 0.1 percentage points, respectively. Furthermore, it
should be kept in mind that this data does not include dividends, interest, and coupons from certain
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sources.93 If we assume that 80 percent of the New York City income stemming from dividends,
interest and coupons accrued to the top one percent of the population, the income share of the top
one percent would be as high as 44.4 percent in 1863. A lower percent share is in order for New
York City compared to the nation as a whole. The top one percent of income earners in NYC
refers to a higher earning group than the top one percent one percent for the nation. Thus it is
more likely that a larger portion of New York City income from dividends, interest, and coupons
accrued to income groups outside of the top one percent.
In 1868, the top 1 percent of all New York City residents received 28 percent of all income.
The top 0.1 percent received 11.2 percent of all income, and the top 0.01 percent received 3.9
percent of all income. As before, weakening the assumption about the number of days worked per
year for individuals that did not pay income tax would increase the shares of those at the top.
Assuming an average work year of 290 days would increase the share of the top 1, 0.1, and 0.01
percent of New York City head of household residents in 1868 by 1, 0.4, and 0.1 percentage points,
respectively. If we assume that 80 percent of the New York City income stemming from dividends,
interest and coupons accrued to the top one percent of the population, the income share of the top
one percent would be as high 35.8 percent in 1868.
In figure 3, I display income shares for the top 1, 0.1, and 0.01 percent of Philadelphia head
of household residents from 1864 to 1866. In 1864, the top 1 percent in Philadelphia received 28.3
percent of total income. The top 0.1 percent received 10.1 percent of total income, and the top 0.01
percent, the 15 individuals with the largest incomes in Philadelphia, received 2.7 percent of total
income. Weakening the assumption about the number of days worked per year for individuals that
did not pay income tax would increase the shares of those at the top. Assuming an average work
year of 290 days would increase the shares of the top 1 and 0.1 percent of Philadelphia head of
household residents in 1864 by 0.8 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively. As with New York City,
these figures do not include income from dividends, interest and coupons. If we assume that 80
percent of the Philadelphia income stemming from dividends, interest and coupons accrued to the
top one percent of the population, the income share of the top one percent would be as high 39.4
percent in 1864. Thus income inequality in Philadelphia in 1864 was high but not as high as in New
York City in 1863.
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Figure 2.3 - Income shares of Top 1, 0.1, 0.01 percent in Philadelphia from 1864 to 1866
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In 1866, the
he top 1 percent of all Philadelphia head of household residents received 22.3
percent of total income. The top 0.1 percent received 7.7 percent of total income, and the top 0.01
percent received 1.8 percent of total income. Assuming
ssuming an average work year of 290 days would
increase the share of the top 1, 0.1
0.1, and 0.01 percent of Philadelphia head of household residents in
1866 by 1, 0.4, and 0.1 percentage points, respectively. If we assume that 80 percent of the
Philadelphia income stemming from dividends, interest and coupons accrued to the top one percent
of the population, the income share of the top one percent would be as high 29.5 percent in 1866.
Thus there are two interesting conclusions from examination of the city data. First, we see a
measured fall in income inequality in Philadelphia and New Y
York
ork City during the 1860s. Second,
income inequality in New York City and Philadelphia was much higher than in the United States as a
whole. This is in accord with Kuznets’ findings for the 20th century who also found the income
inequality was more concentrated
ntrated in urban centers.94
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Tax Fraud
To this point, I have presented national and city level statistics for the income shares of top
income groups. However, I have not talked about tax fraud. To the degree that the top one percent
(and the top 0.1 and 0.01 for New York City and Philadelphia) under reported their incomes, the
total income of the group would be less and thus our calculations for the percent of total income
accruing to the top one percent of tax units would be downwardly biased. Undoubtedly, this is the
case to some degree. However, what is important here is the relative level of tax fraud during the
1860s compared to present. If there was significantly more tax fraud during the Civil War income
tax as compared to the present income tax, then difference between statistics for 1860s and for the
20th and 21st century would at least partially be a result of fraud and not actual differences in income
inequality. Ideally, one would undertake a complete investigation of the relative degree of fraud
during the Civil War and current income tax. However, this would be an enormous task and
necessitate much more space than is available in this paper. As a result, I will confine myself to
refuting arguments that income tax fraud was exceptional during the 1860s.
Some contemporaries to the Civil War income tax identified fraud and evasion as a
significant problem. “Complaints continue to be received at this office that many persons liable to
income tax fail to make full returns,” explained Joseph Lewis, commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, in a Treasury department circular in early 1865. “Those complaints have become
so general,” he continued, “that I deem it a duty I owe to the public service to call the attention of
assessors to the subject, that they may exert the necessary diligence to remove, if possible, the
cause.”95 Furthermore, many contemporaries argued that the degree of fraud increased in the later
part of the 1860s. “Those only who were officially and intimately connected at this time with the
Internal Revenue Department of the United States Treasury,” argued David Wells, who Congress
appointed in 1865 to a commission of three to investigate the federal tax system, “can form any
adequate idea of the amount of perjury and fraud that characterized and pervaded the country,
during the years 1867 to 1872.” “American ingenuity was never more strikingly illustrated - not even
by the exhibits of the patent office,” insisted Wells, “than it was at that time in devising and
successfully carrying out methods for evading the taxes on income and distilled spirits.”96 And
others had similar opinions “For years, it has been perfectly well understood by all familiar with the
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subject,” explained the New York Times in 1869, “that the Government loses enormous sums
annually through the failure of citizens to comply with the law in making their income returns.” “It
is not doubted that five per cent. on all the incomes of this country,” the Times continued, “if
correctly assessed and faithfully collected, would realize sixty millions of dollars annually, instead of
the thirty-four or thirty five millions now received from this source.”97
For the 1860s, where evidence was presented, contemporaries who insisted that fraud was
exception, like David Wells, based their conclusion on a falling nominal value of the amount
individuals self-reported. Likewise, of the few non-contemporary academics who wrote on income
tax fraud during the Civil War, those who argued that it was exceptional in the late 1860s based their
thesis on falling nominal values of self-reported income.98 Total self-reported income did decrease
almost every year after 1864 (except in 1868 and 1869). Some of this decrease was a result of an
increase in the minimum amount exempted. $600 was exempted from taxation of income earned in
1865 and before. The amount exempted was increased to $1,000 for income earned in 1866 where
it stayed until the final two years of the Civil War income tax. This undeniably decreased the
amount of self-reported income during 1866, 1867 and 1868. However, the story goes that the
decrease in returns cannot be fully explained by the change in exemptions in the latter part of the
1860s. While initially enticing, this explanation does not fully take into account the fall in the price
level and the increase in income derived from dividends, interest and coupons.
Let’s first look at the price level. During the first five years of the 1860s, the price level
jumped by 77 percent due to increase in demand, the inability of supply to completely respond, and
the diversion of large amounts of the factors of production to the war effort. However, with the
war over, prices reversed course. Indeed, between 1866 and 1868, the price level fell on average 6.5
percent per year.99 Thus nominal self-reported income would be expected to decrease unless one
assumes a sufficiently large increase in the income share of top earners. What is the real trend in
self-reported income for the later part of the decade? Could it be that fall in the nominal value of
self-reported income was just a result of a falling price level? In table 4, I display the value of selfreported income of the top one percent of tax units in 1866 dollars. As we can see, in 1867, there is
still a fall in the total amount of income self-reported by the top one percent. However, it is much
97
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smaller than the nominal decrease displayed in table 1, and the real increase in 1868 more than
makes up for the decrease during the previous year.
Furthermore, this story fails to take into account the increase in income deriving from
dividends, interest, and coupons from banks, railroads, insurance companies, and other
transportation companies. Indeed, as can be seen in table 4, during these three years, there is a
significant increase in the real value of such income. It is so large such that the nominal trend also
shows a marked increase.100 Thus, if we take these two factors together and look at the total real
income of the top one percent of tax units, we see that it increased in 1867, and even more
dramatically in 1868. Indeed, it was increasing faster than real GDP such that the income share of
the top one percent increased in 1867 and, even more so in 1868. As a result, the basis for Wells
and others who argued that income tax fraud was exceptional during the late 1860s doesn’t stand up
once we contextualize their story with developments in the economy and take into account all
sources of income.101
Table 2.4: Real income of top 1% of tax units (1866 dollars, millions)
Self-reported income
Dividends, interest, and coupons
Income of top 1%
GDP
Source: see text.

1866
$570
$168
$738
$9,081

1867
$545
$200
$745
$9,169

1868
$621
$218
$840
$9,403

To be sure, some contemporaries thought that tax fraud was minimal. “[T]he most signal
pecuniary success has attended the operations of the bureau” to stamp out income tax fraud,
explained the New York Times in 1865.102 Others held similar views. “In England, it is estimated by
an able writer on taxation that the government is defrauded of full one third of the taxes due it,”
explains the American News Company publisher in his preface to the list of New Yorkers’ reported
taxable income in 1863, “We do think that in this county it will amount to no more than one tenth
and much of that results from ignorance rather than a desire to defraud.”
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Indeed, laws were changed over the decade such to empower the Bureau of Internal
Revenue to fight income tax fraud. Under the revenue act of 1862, if an individual’s list of income
was thought to be incomplete, internal revenue officers were allowed to increase it. However, the
taxpayer could nullify changes if he took an oath that his income did not exceed the reported
amount.103 This changed under the revenue act of 1865. To prevent fraud, especially among high
income earners, the assistant assessor was given the power to increase any individual’s self-reported
income, even if the individual had taken an oath as to the verity of the amount reported. If such an
action was taken by the assistant assessor and the individual was dissatisfied with the result, he had
the right to appeal his case to the assessor and Commissioner of Internal Revenue. However, there
were no guarantees that his assessed income would be changed back.104
Furthermore, the Revenue Act of 1865, created fines for non-compliance with the law. For
failure to file a return, tax payers were charged a penalty of 25 percent of taxes due. Under the
revenue act of 1867, the penalty for failure to file a return was increased to 50 percent of taxes
due.105 For false returns, tax payers were charged 100 percent of taxes due.106 In the task of
detecting fraudulent returns, revenue agents and inspectors were given considerable power. “The
law of Congress gives to the Revenue Agent and his inspectors,” explained the New York Times in
1865, “the right to enter premises, take books, examine accounts, shut up shops, swear witnesses,
send for persons and papers and exact fines through the medium of the courts.”107 The ability of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue to detect fraud increased in 1865 with the creation of a small group
of officers empowered to act as internal revenue police: “And be it further enacted,” read the said
act, “that the Secretary of the Treasury may appoint not exceeding ten revenue agents, whose duties
shall be, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to aid in the prevention, detection and
punishment of frauds upon the internal revenue, and in the enforcement of the collection
thereof.”108 These ten revenue agents essentially acted as “chiefs of detective police in their several
departments,” explained the New York Times.109
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One might then ask, if it seems that fraud was taken seriously by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and there is no substantial evidence that it was exceptional in the late 1860s, why were
some contemporaries so prone to associating the income tax with an exceptional level of fraud?
This question is hard to answer with any certainty. It could have been that individuals failed to
understand developments (i.e. falling prices and the multisource nature of income). However,
further examination of contemporary debate reveals a motive for disseminating such a story.
Among the many indictments anti-income tax politicians used to fight for its repeal, a prominent
argument was that income tax fraud was high and that it was a result of the “perjury-provoking”
nature of the income tax.110 In essence, the tax itself was a corrupting influence. The supposed tax
fraud was evidence of it, and, to preserve the good nature of Americans, the income tax had to be
abolished. However curious, this logic might explain why such a story got so much traction despite
evidence to the contrary. Whatever the case, it seems that tax fraud was not exceptional in the late
1860s and that the income share statistics calculated using Civil War income tax data are comparable
to Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez’s series on income inequality for the 20th and 21st century.111
Comparison with current data
In figure 4, I display Piketty and Saez’s data for the income share of the top one percent
between 1913 and 2012 with the statistics calculated here. The red line represents Piketty and Saez’s
series which excludes capital gains and the blue line represents their series which includes capital
gains.112 What looks like a small check mark on the left edge of the graph is the statistics for the
income share of the top one percent of tax units in 1866 through 1868. The dotted line connecting
the data from the Civil War income tax to the current income tax is the required average trend line
for the two series to meet. As we can see, the income share of the top one percent of tax units
during the late 1860s was significantly lower than it was during the decade encompassing World War
I. Indeed, it represents a low in US history comparable to the late 1960s and early 1970s.
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Figure 2.4: Income share of top 1% of tax units
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While counter to Lee Soltow’s conclusion, this result makes sense given current
understanding of the nature of income inequality and developments during the Civil War decade. A
number of recent studies on income inequality in the 20th and 21st centuries have shown that
economic turmoil, recession and, even more so, depression cause high incomes to fall
disproportionately and thus reduce income inequality, at least in the years immediately after a crisis.
For example, Piketty and Saez (2003) find that “most of the decline [in income inequality] from 1927
to 1960 took place during the four years of World War II.” The Social Security Administration and
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Claudia Goldin and Robert Margo (1992) find similar results.113 Likewise, the New York City
Comptroller’s office has shown that income inequality in NYC fell after the Great Recession.114
The year after the Civil War ended was plagued by recession. Real gross domestic product
fell by 4.6% between 1865 and 1866. Not until 1868 did real GDP surpass its 1865 peak. Even
before the recession set in, prices began to plummet and didn’t stabilize until 1872. Between 1864
and 1868, the price level fell 18.2 percent.115 If we look through the lens of current studies, we
might expect these developments to lead to low levels of income inequality.
More importantly, the Civil War, although maybe not initially, became a vehicle for the
destruction of slavery – a system that represented economic inequality in its extreme. Its success can
be seen by examination of wealth statistics. In 1860, southern men made up 59 percent of the
wealthiest one percent of adult males in the United States. Ten years later, southern men only
accounted for 18 percent of the same group. Average real wealth of white southern males decreased
from $3,978 in 1860 to $1,440 in 1870.116 The slave-owning, planter class in the South was
decimated by the destruction wrought on Southern land, animals, and liberation of its most prized
asset, slaves. To the degree that bondage was destroyed and African Americans experienced an
increase in economic freedom, income inequality would have changed.117 Indeed, in 1866, Congress
abrogated the nascent Presidential Reconstruction system which allowed White southerners
significant freedom in resubjugating the newly freed slaves. In its place, Congress empowered
African Americans through the Freedman’s Bureau and other institutions. The result was unheard
of economic freedom for African Americans. Laws were put in place to shifted risk from
fluctuation in crop yields to creditors and landlords, to allow farmers to sell crops to the highest
bidder, and much more.118 At the same time, a number of states in the North passed legislation
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limiting the work day to eight hours.119 All of these institutions, especially those in the South,
dramatically affected the pre-tax distribution of income.
Moreover, during the 1860s, the federal government was taxing the rich more than ever
before. In 1862, as we already know, individuals had to pay a federal tax on income earned for first
time in US history. Dividends, interest, and coupons were taxed. In the same year, the federal
government passed a tax on inheritance. Even business gross revenue was taxed. Indeed, there is
ample evidence that these laws were adopted with the intent to equitably distribute the tax burden.120
Given all of these developments, it seems natural that income inequality reached such relatively low
numbers in 1866, 1867, and 1868.
Why is this important? Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez showed that the Kuznets curve
started to doubled back on itself in the late 1970s.121 The conclusion here shows that the Kuznets
119
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curve might have already completed its famed upside down ‘U’ trajectory, although abruptly, during
the Civil War decade and began to double back on itself during the Gilded Age. This statement is
obviously dependent on high income inequality before the war. Sadly, we don’t have national
statistics for the income share of the top one percent of tax units during this period. However, all
evidence we do have for the late ante-bellum period points to a very high level of inequality.122
Indeed, we have seen that income inequality fell in New York City and Philadelphia over the 1860s.
Most likely, the fall in income inequality would have been more dramatic in the South because of the
reasons mentioned above.
If the Kuznets curve already completed its trajectory during Reconstruction and was
doubling back on itself during the Gilded Age, it would shine some light on the importance of
different mechanism in understanding inequality. Namely, it would be hard to describe the decrease
in inequality during the 1860s as the result of the change in rewards for skilled labor relative to
unskilled labor or other purely economic explanations. Instead, the change in inequality most likely
came from the destruction of slavery and other parallel changes in laws and institutions. Indeed,
Simon Kuznets himself argued that “legislative interference and political decisions” are important in
understanding the evolution of income inequality in a democracy. The result of increases in income
inequality “would be an increasing pressure of legal and political decisions on upper-income shares,”
explained Kuznets, “increasing as a country moves to higher economic levels.” Thus Kuznets
attributed at least some of the decrease in income inequality during the 1930s and 1940s in the
United States to increasing political pressures. From the data present here and our understanding of
the Civil War and Reconstruction, we can extend Kuznets’ speculation. It seems that the legislative
pressure Kuznets talks about were also important in reducing inequality during the Civil War decade.
Indeed, we could even go so far as to speculate that the United States has experienced cycles in
income inequality and that “legislative interference and political decisions” are important in
understanding both the ups and downs in the cycles.123 This is obviously only a preliminary
hypothesis. However, as Kuznets colorfully explained, “speculation is an effective way to present a
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broad view of the field; and that so long as it is recognized as a collection of hunches calling for
further investigation rather than a set of fully tested conclusions, little harm and much good may
result.”124
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CHAPTER 3
THE ECONOMIC PLAYING FIELD FROM THE 1870S THROUGH THE
1920S
Introduction
How did the orientation of laws and institutions change in relation to income inequality
between the 1870s and 1920s? Were laws and institutions set up to empower broad sections of the
population and thus maintain some level of equality in society? Or were laws and institutions set up
to embrace income inequality by empowering narrow groups in the economic realm? To be sure,
the period was the birth place of many laws which were held up to the population as bastions of
equality. For example, created to reduce price discrimination and monopoly power, the Interstate
Commerce Act and the famed Sherman Anti-Trust Act were made law in the middle of this period.
Thus it might seem that laws represents a compromise to the inequalities of the economy.
However, as any keen observer of politics from any period will admit, de facto implementation of a
law does not always correspond to the statements which clothe it in political debates. The purpose
of this paper is to analyze the evolution of the orientation of laws and institutions in the United
States compared to income inequality from the 1870s through the 1920s, by immersing ourselves in
the history.
In the first section, I review the evolution of the income share of the top one percent of the
population between the 1870s and 1920s using data presented in the previous chapter. In the
second section, I begin my analysis of the evolution of laws and institutions by examining state
legislation. In the third section, because of the growing aggressiveness of state and federal courts
after the mid-1880s, I turn to the history of the labor injunction to understand the evolution of de
facto law from the mid-1880s through the 1920s. In the fourth section, building on the history of
the injunction, I put forward a series which can be used as a proxy for the general trend for the
orientation of laws and institutions in the United States during the period in question. In the final
section, I analyze the relation between this trend and that of income inequality presented in the first
section. As we shall see, laws and institutions moved in unison with inequality. As the years
passed, laws and institutions were oriented more and more to benefit narrows groups in the
population.
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Income inequality between the 1870s and 1920s
In figure 1, I display the income share of the top one percent of all US Americans between
1866 and 1929. The red line represents Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez’s series which excludes
capital gains and the blue line represents their series which includes capital gains.125 What looks like
a small check mark on the left edge of the graph is the statistics for the income share of the top one
percent of tax units in 1866, 1867,
7, and 1868 calculated in the previous chapter. Unfortunately, there
is no data on the income share of the top one percent between the Civil War income tax and the
current income tax. The Civil War income tax was allowed to expire in 1872, and, besides the
t short,
half year of the 1894 income tax, there was no other federal income tax and thus no national data
until the current income tax was initiated in 1913. Thus we can only estimate an average trend for
the missing years. The dotted line connecting tthe 19th century data to the 20th century data
represents the required average trend line for the two series to meet.
Figure 3.1:
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As we can see, income inequality increased from the late 1860s through 1916. In the late
1860s, the income share of the top one percent averaged 8.39 percent of total income. By the time

125

Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel (2003), “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913 – 1998”, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics,, Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 11-39. For data up to 2012, see
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/#income
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/#income.

68

the current income tax was implemented in 1913, the income share of the top one percent had
increased to almost 18 percent of total income, and, by 1916, it had almost reached 19 percent of all
income. During the late 1910s, the income share of the top one percent decreased reaching 14.45
percent of total income in 1920. However, in the 1920s, income inequality shot up once again. By
1928, the income share (including capital gains) of the top one percent of the population surpassed
21 percent of all income. Thus with the exception of part of the 1910s, income inequality was rising
between the 1870s and 1920s. One must then ask, what was the orientation of laws and institutions
during this period? To begin to answer this question, let us first analyze the state laws.
The orientation of laws and institutions – the state level
Most of the legislation passed between the 1870s and 1920s was done at the state level. For
example, laws that attempted to curb monopoly pricing and price discrimination by stipulating
maximum rates railroads could charge passengers and for transporting freight and maximum rates
grain warehouses could charge for storage were purely a state endeavor in the 1870s. In 1871, state
legislatures in Illinois and Minnesota both passed maximum rate laws. In 1874, Wisconsin and Iowa
followed suit.126 Likewise, state legislatures in Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Ohio formed bureaus of labor in their states in the 1870s.127 And, in the first half of the 1880s,
state legislatures in California, Iowa, Michigan, New York, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Kansas also
passed legislation for labor boards. Rules regulating factory inspection were first adopted at the state
level. In 1878, New Jersey’s state legislature adopted the first laws mandating factory inspection, and
in the next six years, five other states did the same.128 Indeed, states legislatures passed an
impressive body of laws between the 1870s and 1920s regarding such issues as maximum hours
employee were allowed to worked, child labor, weighing of coal for the determination of miner
remuneration, payment in script, tenement labor, injunctions, and many other issues pertinent to
labor. However, the de facto orientation of laws and institutions is much more complicated than
merely tracking the chronological history of when legislation was passed.129 To get a better
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understand of state level developments, it is best to break up the larger period into two: 1870s to
mid-1880s and mid-1880s to 1920s.
During the first period, some state laws were successful. For example, Minnesota’s
regulation of railroad fairs was effective for the first four years after passing the law in 1871. The
state set up a railroad commissioner to administer its maximum rate law. Railroads that failed to
comply were subject to forfeiture of charter or a fine of up to $1,000 for each violation. While the
roads did not exactly comply with rates laid out by the state, they did reduced their fairs after
enactment of the law. “[N]otwithstanding the imperfections of the law, and the fact that the
companies have professed to disregard it,” reported Governor of Minnesota, Horace Austin in 1872,
“I am convinced that it has in no small degree, modified their charges and saved the people no
inconsiderable sum, in the aggregate.”130 Other state level labor legislation saw success.
Massachusetts state legislature passed a law in 1874 prohibiting women working in mills from
laboring more than eight hours a day. “Because few mills, if any, could function long after the
women had gone home,” explains labor historian David Montgomery, “the law effectively
established a new standard for [men and women in] textiles.”131
However, as mentioned above, the success or failure of a law was never as simple as getting
it passed. In some instances, effective laws were replaced by ineffective laws as a result of lobbying
strategies employed by those the laws sought to regulate. For example, in 1875, Minnesota’s state
legislature repealed its laws regulating rates for railroads and public store houses. In 1876,
Wisconsin’s legislature did the same. Thus, in 1877 when the Supreme Court ruled in Munn v. Illinois
that the state had the power to regulate business when it affected a public good, many of the states
which had initiated legislation which led to Munn v. Illinois had already repealed the laws under
scrutiny. “[T]he question now definitely settled by the Court [in Munn v. Illinois] has, for the most
part, become of little practical moment,” concluded the president of the Chicago & North Western
Railroad, in his annual report for 1877, “the States whose acts gave rise to this legislation having
repealed their onerous laws, excepting the State of Iowa, were biennial sessions of its Legislature
have no doubt longer delayed similar action.” As predicted, Iowa state legislature repealed its rate
laws the very next year. In its place, the legislature enacted a commission to “give advice” to the
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railroads in regards to rates. However, the railroads did not have to follow the advice and the
commission’s salaries were paid by the railroads.132
At the same time, many state labor laws were ineffective. Labor historian Henry David
makes this point. Before 1886 with “one or two exceptions, none [of the state bureau of labors
were]… equipped either in funds or personnel to function properly.” In terms of child labor
legislation for the same period, “It can safely be said that the age levels were so low, the means of
escaping the restriction so numerous, the penalties for violation so mild, and the machinery for
administration so inadequate,” argues David, “that this legislation did not prevent the employment
of young children in industry.” Indeed, David even goes on to conclude: in general, before the mid1880s, state laws “were seriously lacking in proper administrative provisions. There were many
loopholes for escape, the inspectors were few and generally lax, and the penalties for violations were
too mild. Thus, the law may give a more favorable picture of industrial conditions than was actually
the case.”133
Hence the de facto orientation of laws and institutions from the 1870s to the mid-1880s is
not as easily ascertained as listing the chronology of labor legislation. Indeed, the de facto trend is
not completely clear. It doesn’t seem overwhelmingly positive for labor as some have maintained.
Nor were laws being enacted and adjudicated aggressively to the detriment of labor as they were
later in the century. Instead, it seems that there was not much active change in either direction.
Instead, it seems that laws and institutions were allowed to drift behind economic developments
between the 1870s and mid-1880s.
In this early period in the South, the picture was much different. After redeeming their
states from Republican control,134 Southern Democrats remade laws and institutions so as to assert
white control over black labor. “Broad new vagrancy laws allowed the arrest of virtually any person
without a job,” explains historian Eric Foner, “and ‘antienticement’ laws made it a criminal offence
to offer employment to an individual already under contract, or to leave a job before a contract had
expired.” Laws were also put in place which banned the sale of unginned cotton and other farm
products during the night. Although not explicitly stated, all these laws were meant for African
Americans. “[A] single instance of punishment of whites under these acts has never occurred,”
132
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noted a Tennessee black convention, “and is not expected.” At the same time, punishment for
petty theft was severely increased. In North Carolina and Virginia, “they send [a man] to the
penitentiary if he steals a chicken,” charged a black spokesman. If not the intent, the result was to
enable the prolific growth of the convict labor system. “Within two months of Redemption,”
explains Foner, “South Carolina’s legislature authorized the hiring out of virtually every convict in
the state, as did Florida after dismantling its penitentiary.” “Railroads, mining and lumber
companies, and planters vied for access to this new form of involuntary labor, the vast majority of
whom were blacks imprisoned for petty crimes.” This process also took place on a more informal
level during this early period. As a result, while “the region’s new upper class of planters, merchants,
and industrialists prospered,” concludes Foner, “the majority of Southerners of both races sank
deeper and deeper into poverty.”135 Thus, when one takes into account the South, the overall
picture changes. The lack of change in the North and Midwest seems to be outdone by aggressive
changes taking place in the South.
After the mid-1880s, things changed outside the South. State and federal courts became
much more aggressive and were able to stymie most state level legislation that seriously inferred with
business. For example, in 1884, New York state legislature passed a law prohibiting the manufacture
of cigars in tenement housing.136 One year later, the New York Court of Appeals struck down the
law in In re Jacobs arguing that it infringed on labor’s constitutional liberty.137 This decision marked a
revolutionary change in the court’s understanding of due process of the law, liberty, and property.
Until Jacobs, due process was understood as a procedural guarantee. As mentioned in the declaration
of independence, liberty referred to freedom from restraint, and property denoted the static right to
ownership and use. Jacobs was the first step in completely reinterpreting these terms and the
legislature’s place in society. Liberty was reconstrued to mean the right to following ones lawful
calling. The definition of property was expanded to include such intangibles as earning potential,
and due process was reinterpreted to signify a guarantee to protection against “arbitrary” legislation
which infringed on ones liberties and property.138 This reinterpretation from Munn v. Illinois which
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became more and more entrenched after Jacobs justified court intervention to invalidate legislation,
and prevent labor activity, when it infringed on citizens’ newly defined liberties and property rights.
Intervene they did. “During the 1880s and 1890s,” explains labor historian William Forbath, “courts
were far more likely than not to strike down the very laws that labor sought most avidly.” Indeed,
“by 1920,” continues Forbath, “courts had struck down roughly three hundred labor laws.”139
Because the overall effect of state labor laws was ambiguous outside the South before the
mid-1880s and because state labor laws came under increasingly aggressive attack after 1885 from
the courts, it seems more revealing to look at how law played out on the ground by analyzing the
most important development of the period – the labor injunction. The injunction did not develop
through the legislative branch – although many of the late 19th century statues were used to increase
its reach. It developed through the judiciary, and the legislature was either unwilling or unable (due
to gridlock or inability to match the court’s resolve) to resist. The injunction was most successfully
and aggressively applied to strikes that utilized broad base support, sought to obtain more than just
monetary gains (like a closed shop), and utilized secondary boycotts and “don’t patronize” lists.140
To a large degree, the injunction was a trump on local developments. It represented law which
could be used over labor friendly local authorities to the benefit of business. To its history, we now
turn.
A brief history of the labor injunction
On June 1, 1877, the Pennsylvania Railroad cut employees’ wages by ten percent. One by
one, other railroads followed suit. In mid-July, in reaction to these cuts and a number of other
grievances, railway workers went on strike in Illinois and Indiana. These strikes set off others strikes
and mob activity in cities and towns throughout the country. At its climax, the scale of the Great
Strike of 1877, as it came to be called, was immense. About 50,000 miles of the nation’s 75,000
miles of track were located in areas affected by the strike, and, in a number of cities including
Chicago, general strikes paralyzed all activity.141
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The strike pitted the collective organization and wills of workers against those of the
railroads.142 During this spatter of contests, a development in law took place which tilted the playing
field, for some railroads, to the disadvantage of labor. Some of the struck line, like the Erie, were in
receivership – the roads had failed and were in the custody of the courts. Circuit Judge Thomas
Drummond of Chicago and Judge Samuel Treat of a district in Southern Illinois issued “writs of
assistance” – orders to US marshals to protect the property in the custody of the court and to arrest
anyone who tried to damage or interfere with its functioning. Offenders did not have to be
specifically named in the writ, nor served notice of its existence, and could be punished for
contempt of court without the trouble of a trial by jury.143
While “writs of assistance” only played a minor role during the Great Strike of 1877, solvent
railway companies couldn’t help but notice how effective they were for trains in receivership. “[A]s
our recent experience has shown,” explained Thomas Scott, President of the Pennsylvania Railroad,
“the only roads which could procure prompt protection and immunity from interference [during the
Great Strike] were those whose misfortune had made them bankrupt and place them in direct
custody and receivers appointed by the United States courts.” “To the aid of these roads the United
States Marshal could call United States troops,” explained Scott, “and no rioter dared to resist the
power represented by the small but admirably disciplined detachments quartered near the scenes of
the recent troubles.”144 Worker contention swept aside, employers on these lines were more able to
impose their will and reduce wages tilting the distribution of income inside the firm in their and the
owners’ favor.
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As time passed, the labor injunction was developed to extend the advantages enjoyed by
trains in receivership to solvent roads, other parts of the economy, and to repress different types of
labor activity. Like the “writs of assistance”, the effect of the injunction was to tilt the playing field
in the favor of big business thus enabling it to take a larger share of revenue. And, as injunctions
hemmed in more and more of labor activity, the share of those at the top grew larger and larger.
The pages below recount these developments.
In 1886, strikes broke out on the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern. Upon request from
Lake Shore attorneys, injunctions were issued by state and United States courts. These first
injunctions were similar to the “writs of assistance” used during the Great Strike.145 They allowed
for the arrest of any striker interfering with the railroad’s right to do business, and offenders could
be punished for contempt of court without the trouble of a trial by jury. However, there were some
differences between these first injunctions and their predecessor. On the one hand, the first
injunctions still followed the traditional principal of specifically naming the individuals to be
enjoined and directly serving them notice of the enjoinment – a much more restricted and
cumbersome process than with the “writs” issued during the Great Strike of 1877. On the other
hand, the injunction opened up a much broader possibility of usage. “Writs of assistance” were only
applicable to strikes occurring on property in receivership. While injunctions were traditionally
considered “an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only in an emergency characterized by
immediate irreparable damage to physical property,” they could be used, if the courts allowed, to
protect any kind of property. In order to expand the potential of the injunction, where in many
cases physical property was not strictly threatened, judges had to develop a much broader idea of
property – one that included the abstract right to do business. As we have seen, this development
was already taking place in other juridical spheres. The injunctions used during the Lake Shore and
Michigan Southern strike represent one of the first usages of this more liberal definition of property
as defined in Jacobs.
The developments in 1886 were not without a tinge of irony. The issuer of the injunction
from the United State court, Judge Gresham based his authority to enjoin striking railway workers
on the Enforcement Act – a Reconstruction statue created to protect African Americans from the
Ku Klux Klan. This very same law had been emasculated by the Supreme Court in 1876, under the
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guise of states’ rights, giving a “green light to acts of terror [against African Americans] where local
officials either could not or would not enforce the law.” Indeed, this decision was a key part in the
re-enslavement of African Americans in the decades after the Civil War. Now, Judge Gresham was
reviving it to empower the federal court to protect the railroads.146
In 1888, the injunction evolved again. A strike broke on the whole Burlington system. To
support the strikers, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers working other lines refused to handle
Burlington cars. Upon the railroad’s attorney’s request, District Judge Elmer Dundy issued a
temporary injunction binding Brotherhood workers from boycotting the Burlington line. “We
therefore… do strictly command you,” declared Dundy, “under penalty of --- dollars, to be levied
upon you land, goods, and chattels to our use, that you do absolutely desist… from meddling or
interfering… [with the railroad’s] property [and business]… and from doing any other act or thing…
in carrying out your unlawful, unjust, and wicked purposes through your unlawful, unjust, and
wicked combination, connivance, and conspiracy, either as individuals or as members of the
Brotherhood.”147
Dundy based his decision, which was later made permanent, on the Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887 – which was supposedly created to prevent railroads from discriminating against small
farmers and manufactures in isolated localities. Judge Dundy’s decisions and the decisions of two
other judges deciding on cases resulting from the same strike but in different localities broadened
the list of illegal and enjoinable activities to include secondary boycotts. The importance of
secondary boycotts to pressure employers for an increase in wage (or better working conditions) and
thus manipulate the distribution of revenue inside a firm should not be underestimated. Indeed, the
Burlington strikers believed that they would have won their fight against the railroad in 1888 if the
Brotherhood’s boycott had continued.148
The Burlington decision also expanded the legal sphere of the injunction in another way.
While Judge Dundy named specific persons and parties to be enjoined, he broadened its scope by
adding “their unknown confederates, whose names when discovered [were] to be inserted.” This
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began the processes of merging one aspect of the “writ of assistance” to the injunction. However,
individuals were still served notice. As the Chicago Tribune reported, “officers of the United States
Court left the Government building with a large basket filled with injunction papers against
individual engineers and are serving them as fast as possible.” Two days after the injunction was
issued, court officials were still racing around looking for boycotting railroad engineers and firemen
to give them notice of the injunction.149
Labor law was again changed in 1893. Brotherhood railway workers on the Ann Arbor and
North Michigan road went on strike. In support, Brotherhood members on other lines boycotted
the Ann Arbor line. District Judge Augustus J. Ricks issued an injunction against railroad employees
from quitting work with the intent to interfere with commerce. Labor was incensed. “Judge Ricks’
interpretation of the law is outrageous,” declared James P. Archibald, a delegate from the Paper
Hangers’ Union. “His decision simply means that railroad employers have no right to strike.”
While workers still had the right to quit, Judge Ricks’ decision, and Judge Dundy’s previous decision,
reduced the realm in which it was okay for an employee to quit. A worker could still quit
individually for the purpose of taking another job. However, Ricks’ and Dundy’s decision made
quitting with the intent to affect the price of labor enjoinable. This further bound labor’s hands
reducing its ability to obtain a more equitable share of revenue from their employers.150
Furthermore, instead of issuing an injunction for a specific road and its employees like in the
Burlington case, Judge Ricks broadened the scope of the injunction by issuing it against eight
railroads and their employees. He did away with the cumbersome process of serving each individual
and instead published the injunction. Still not satisfied with events, officials of the Ann Arbor road
filed for an injunction against the Grand Chief of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers for
ordering the boycott. The receiver of the claim and future President of the United States, Judge
William Taft complied issuing an injunction against the head of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers – once more extending the scope of the injunction for the benefit of big business.
In 1894, labor law again evolved. Pullman railroad workers went on strike due to a
reduction in wages without a similar reduction in rents in the company owned town of Pullman,
Illinois. To support the Pullman workers’ strike, the American Railway Union (ARU) called for all
members of the union to boycott Pullman cars. Upon request by the U.S. District Attorneys, Judge
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Woods and Judge Grosscup issued an injunction against the ARU and its members for boycotting
Pullman cars. The New York Times described their injunction as “A Gatling gun on paper… a
veritable dragnet...one of those peculiar instruments that punishes an individual for doing a certain
thing, and is equally merciless if he does not do it.” The injunctions was based on the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act of 1890 – ostensibly created to curtail the unrelenting concentration of industry and
the increase in economic inequality. Thus, once again, a statute purported to ameliorate the
condition of oppressed groups was used to help big business by broadening the nature of the labor
injunction. This was not a surprise to some. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, explained Senator
Orville Platt shortly after its passage, was just the realization of a desire “to get some bill headed: ‘A
Bill to Punish Trusts’ with which to go to the country.”151
The Pullman decisions increased the power of the labor injunction. During the Ann Arber
case, Judge Ricks had issued an injunction against eight railroads and their employees. This
precedent was greatly expanded during the Pullman strike. Judge Woods and Judge Grosscup issued
their injunction against workers on twenty-two Chicago railroads and served this vast body of
workers by means of publications. The New York Times explained that “Under this interpretation
thousands of strikers might be arrested day after day and be arraigned and summarily dealt with for
contempt of court, and this is precisely the policy, according to the reports at the Government
Building to-night.” The effect was great. “[T]he strike was broken up… not by the army,” explained
Eugen V. Debs, president of the United Railway Workers, “but simply and solely by the action of
the United States Courts.” Others agreed with Debs’ conclusion of the effectiveness of the
injunction. “The rapid fire injunction is a great improvement on the gatling gun,” explained George
Perkins, the conservative president of the Cigar Makers International Union. “Nothing can get
beyond its range and it never misses fire.”152
The application of “writs of assistance” in the 1870s and 1880s and then the first labor
injunctions in railroad disputes in the second half of the 1880s and early 1890s followed earlier
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precedents of government involvement in railroads. The lines had always been quasi-public in
nature. Indeed, in the case of “writs of assistance”, failed roads were in the care of the court before
the Great Strike. Thus it makes sense that the courts would get involved in one way or another. At
the same time, the path which became increasingly entrenched, especially in the 1890s, was by no
means the logical conclusion of government and railroads’ close relationship. Indeed, on the eve of
the Pullman Strike there were still a number of judicial precedents, although a minority, which dealt
with railroad strikes in ways more advantageous to labor.153 However, the Pullman Strike solidified
the trend of using courts of equity to defend the rights of employers against the collective strategies
of labor. And, in 1895, the Supreme Court, the highest court in the United States, gave its official
stamp on Judge Woods and Judge Grosscup’s decision in Debs v. United States – asserting that
secondary boycotts in the restraint of trade could be enjoined under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Ironically, in the same year, the Supreme Court decided in United States v. E.C. Knight Co. that a
manufacturing company, even if it controlled 90 percent of sugar refining as did the defendant of
the case in question, was excluded from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act because the statute was written
to pertain to commerce monopolies – not manufacturing.154
The extension of the labor injunction to other sectors of the economy had less obvious
grounds. Indeed, as late as the mid-1880s, the validity of labor injunction outside of the railroads
was still uncertain. In the end, it didn’t matter. Judges were able to use the broadening definition of
property rights developing in other spheres or no justification at all to grant injunctions against labor
activity outside the roads. For example, in an 1886 strike for a closed shop at a lumber mill in
Illinois, Judge Garnett issued an injunction against the Furniture Makers Union arguing that the
several defects in the basis of the injunction were “merely formalities” and that “the court will not
search for technicalities or fine spun theories upon which to support a refusal of relief.”155
The usage of the labor injunction outside railroads continued and developed as time passed.
In 1892 during a New Orleans strike, Judge Edward Billings and Judge Pardee issued injunctions
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against the Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council – a trade union which represented all ninety five
unions in New Orleans and their twenty thousand members. The Council had called a general strike
in support of a teamster, packer, and scaleman strike already underway. In what was actually the
first of such a precedent, Judge Billings and Judge Pardee based the injunctions on the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 narrowly applied to discrimination and
restraint of trade involving railroads and thus provided a limited authority to issue injunctions.156
On the other hand, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act pertained to any “contract, combination in the form
of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, [which resulted] in restraint of trade or commerce” and thus
was much more pliable. The U.S. Attorney was able to win the injunction against the Workingmen’s
Amalgamated Council based on the argument that the striking unions were “a gigantic…
combination… for the purpose of restraining the commerce of several states and with foreign
countries.”157 As with the Burlington Strike, the Pullman Strike, and many others, the injunction
abruptly ended efforts by the Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council. “The filing of the suit,”
explained the New York Times, “broke the backbone of the strike.”158
With the injunction closing off more and more collective strategies, labor had to find other
options to press its causes. In the last decade of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, labor
looked to put pressure on employers unfriendly to its cause through dissemination of “Don’t
Patronize” lists. These strategies were incredibly successful for a time.159 However, in the beginning
of the 20th century the injunction was again used to eliminate them a viable strategies.
In 1902, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) placed a Connecticut hat manufacturer on
the “Don’t Patronize” list. The AFL was reacting to the destruction of the hatters union in this
Connecticut plant through firing of union workers and hiring of non-union men. Suffering from a
lack of sales, the owner sought refuge in the courts. In 1908, the Supreme Court, in Loewe v. Lawlor,
decided on the case. It upheld a previous injunction against the boycott awarded by a lesser court
and awarded the owner three times the assessed value of abstract damages resulting from the
boycott which he claimed amounted to $240,000. Members of the hatter’s union were ordered to
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pay.160 The court based its decision of both the illegality of the boycott and the award of treble
damages on the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In 1911, the Supreme Court, in Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., ruled once more on the legality of using injunctions to thwart unions from publishing lists
of ‘unfair’ companies. As a result of these two discussion, this once successful practice gradually
disappeared.161
Another development which received the support of the courts via decisions and use of the
injunction was the legality of yellow dog contracts.162 A yellow dog contract is a signed agreement
by an employee stating that he will not join a union. These contracts were almost always signed
from a position of vulnerability and gave the employer power over the employee by abridging his
basic constitutional rights. From the 1880s until the early 1930s, almost every state law passed to
outlaw yellow dog contracts was struck down.163 In 1908, the Supreme Court, in Adair v. United
States, gave its official endorsement of the trend holding that federal and state legislation prohibiting
yellow-dog contracts were unconstitutional because these laws restrained individuals’ personal liberty
and property. Thus the Supreme Court made it illegal to prohibit contracts that abridged certain
fundamental rights.164
In 1917, the Supreme Court, in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, approved Judge
Dayton’s injunction against United Mine Workers’ (UMW) efforts to unionize miners at the
Hitchman Coal and Coke Company. Judge Dayton prohibited UMW from using “argument, reason
and persuasion” with Hitchman workers and even forbade the union from “talking to” the miners.
This incredible abridgment of basic rights was based on the specious grounds that workers at
Hitchman had signed yellow dog contracts, and thus even the peaceful efforts of the UMW
constituted “conspiracy to induce breach of contract.” Employers reacted enthusiastically to the
Supreme Court’s decision. By the end of the 1920s, companies had cajoled an estimated 1.25
million workers into signing yellow-dog contracts. This development was not without the support
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of the courts. Indeed, injunctions were used more than sixty times during the period to uphold the
sanctity of such contracts.165
In 1921, the Supreme Court, in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-city Central Trades Council,
approved of Judge [?]’s usage of the injunction to stymie the Tri-City Trades Council’s efforts to
picket the American Steel Foundries. Having passed from the United States Court to President of
the United States and then to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, William Taft ruled that the
methods of the Tri-City Trades Council while “lawful in their announced purpose inevitably lead to
intimidation and violence.” “The court then limited the number of pickets to one at each gate. The
Tri-City decision determined the federal law of picketing, and virtually all the state courts followed
the precedent. Henceforth it was virtually impossible for a union legally to man an effective picket
line.” This precedent was further reinforced in 1921, when the Supreme Court, in Truax v. Corrigan,
ruled that Arizona’s law which outlawed the usage of injunctions against peaceful picketing went
counter to the Fourteenth Amendment and was thus unconstitutional.166
In 1925, the Supreme Court, in Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, held that “unions
which struck for the purpose of organizing the unorganized segments of an industry, would, by
obstructing production, violate the Sherman Act.” Resting his authority on the Coronado decision, in
1927, Judge John J. Parker issued an injunction against union efforts to organize non-union miners
in West Virginia. This development made it impossible “for any union to attempt to achieve a
nationwide closed shop for the purpose of protecting union standards.”167
Thus, as time passed, the injunction was developed to cover more and more aspects of
employee-employer relations. Indeed, by the 1920s, judges had so skillfully adjudicated laws and
transformed the idea of property as to stretch the injunction to apply to unionizing workers who had
signed anti-union contracts, secondary boycotts, picketing, the calling of strikes by union leaders,
unionizing of un-unionized sectors of the economy, and the printing of lists of businesses thought
to be unfair towards labor. In the mid-1890s after the Supreme Court gave its official approval to
165
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the use of injunctions against secondary boycotts, Governor Altgeld of Illinois contended that
“Under this new order of things a federal judge becomes at once a legislator, court and executioner.”
“A federal judge could now issue an order at the behest of some corporation attorney,” explained
Altgeld, “prohibiting most anything, including that which the law did not forbid. Thus could the
judge legislate and, having done so, proceed to arrest people and, without a trial, to imprison them,
not for disobeying any statue but on the pretext that they had violated his injunction.” 168 Curiously,
the system that became more and more entrenched as time passed was very similar to that proposed
by Tom Scott after the Great Strike of 1877. From that early period, Scott was already arguing to
extend the power embodied in the “writs of assistance” to protect all trains. “The laws which give
the Federal courts the summary process of injunction to restrain so comparatively trifling a wrong as
an infringement of a patent-right,” implored Scott, “certainly it must have been intended or ought to
give the United States authority to prevent a wrong-doing which not only destroys a particular road,
but also paralyzes the entire commerce of the country and wastes the national wealth.”169
General trend
As time passed, rule by injunction became ever more entrenched. The application of the
labor injunction became both increasingly effective and was applied more and more to regulate labor
affairs. In figure 2, I present data on the usage of injunctions as a percent of secondary strikes from
the 1870s through the 1920s.170 This trend provides a more realistic approximation of the de facto
orientation of laws and institutions from the 1870s through the 1920s than purely indexing state and
federal labor legislation. As we can see, the usage of the injunction in secondary strikes became
increasingly common throughout the final decades of the 19th century and into the first decade of
the 20th century. In the 1880s, at least ten percent of secondary strikes were enjoined. In the 1890s,
the percentage of secondary strikes enjoined reached at least 15 percent. The usage of injunctions
against secondary boycotts accelerated in the 1900s during which period at least 29 percent of
secondary strikes were enjoined.
Figure 3.2: Usage of injunctions against secondary strikes
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The successive slanting of laws and institutions to favor business was not missed by
contemporaries. During the 1912 presidential campaign, Woodrow Wilson insisted that the federal
government be utilized to restore market competition and local self-governance “by strengthening
anti-trust laws, protecting the right of workers to unionize, and actively encouraging small
entrepreneurs.” For Wilson and many others, the late 19th century was not a time of free
competition but of government subservience to big business.171 The growth of the injunction as a
means of regulating labor and state and federal governments’ growing role in enforcing injunctions
was the major driver of that trend. In terms of latter, the National Guard was developed from a
point of almost extinction after the Civil War to a staple institutions of the United States because of
the strikebreaking role it took on. Of the instances where the National Guard was called into active
duty between 1877 and 1892, strikebreaking accounted for 30 percent of the total at the very
minimum. However, this statistic does not include the many colorful euphemisms often used by
commanding officers to log the National Guard’s participation in labor incidents. If included, which
most likely gives a more accurate picture, strikebreaking accounted for well over half of militia
activity. At the same time, on average these instances of active service involved more guardsmen
and for a longer time than other types of active duty.172
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During the Progressive Era, which lasted from the 1900s to the end of Wilson’s presidency
in 1920, laws and institutions were oriented more and more to the benefit of broader groups.
Indeed, we can see from figure 2 that the application of injunctions to secondary strikes decreased in
the second decade of the 20th century. The percent of secondary strikes enjoined fell six percentage
points between the 1900s and 1910. However, the Progressive Era was much more than just a
reduction in the usage of the injunction in secondary strikes. From 1900 to the First World War, the
Progressives pushed through Congress a number of liberal laws. For example, in 1906, the Hepburn
Act became law – representing the first sincere effort to regulate the railroads. Also, the current
income tax was a product of the Progressive movement.
Through the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment and the Revenue Act of 1913, the income
tax was successfully reestablished over the Supreme Court’s 1895 decision against its
constitutionality and tariff duties on goods consumed by lowering income groups were significantly
reduced.173 In terms of the latter, average ad valorem rate for tariff duties were reduce from 40.12
percent under the previous revenue law to around 28 percent under the 1913 act. The income tax of
1913 taxed income above $4,000 for married individuals and income above $3,000 for single
individuals at two percent. An additional tax, a surtax, which ranged from one to six percent, was
added to all income over $20,000. The surtax rates and the amount of income subject to the
surtaxes were increased multiple times throughout the remainder of the Progressive Era. The
Revenue Act of 1916 increased the maximum surtax to 13 percent and slightly increased the amount
of income subject to the highest surtax. The Revenue Act of October 3rd, 1917 dramatically
increased both the maximum surtax rate and the amount of income subject to the highest surtax
such that all incomes above $7,500 were subject to a surtax of 63 percent. The Revenue Act of
1918, which was passed in February 1919, increased the maximum surtax by two more percentage
points pushing the rate to its highest point in the period. 174
At the same time, many of the laws passed by the Progressives either did not attempt to
reverse the orientation of previous laws or, if they did, they met the same fate as their 19th century
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predecessors. For example, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) did not
conflict with any of the Supreme Court’s detrimental decisions on the Interstate Commerce Act and
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Furthermore, President Woodrow Wilson both understaffed the FTC
and appointed people that were unsympathetic to reform. Indeed, Louis Brandeis who helped to
create the FTC later described its management under President Wilson as “a stupid administration.”
At the same time, some legislative gains during this period met the same fate as the Sherman AntiTrust Act. For example, the Child Labor Act of 1916 prohibited the interstate sale of goods which
were produced by laborers under the age of fourteen. However, only two years after it became law,
in Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional, “on the grounds that
Congress could not use it commerce powers to regulate labor conditions.”175
During the 1920s, Progressive impulses floundered and government was taken over by those
with big business’s interests at heart. The American businessman is “the most influential person in
the nation,” exclaimed the organ of the Chamber of Commerce, Nation's Business, in 1925. It now
occupies “a position of leadership which the businessman has never held before.” We can see part
of this reversal in the aggressive increase in usage of the injunction against secondary strikes
depicted in figure 2. Indeed, in the 1920s, the court enjoined at least 46 percent of all secondary
strikes. We also saw this trend in the string of Supreme Court’s decisions (Coronado Coal Co. v. United
Mine, Workers, American Steel Foundries v. Tri-city Central Trades Council, Truax v. Corrigan) detrimental to
labor. At the same time, the reversals of the 1920s spilled into other spheres.
For example, the Revenue Act of 1921 reduced the maximum surtax to 50 percent and the
amount of income subject to it. In addition, the act repealed the excess-profits tax which had been a
large source of government revenue during the war and the focus of much of business’s odium. The
Revenue Act of 1924 reduced the maximum surtax to 40 percent and again reduced the amount of
income subject to the surtax. And the Revenue Act of 1926 cut the maximum surtax of 1924 in half
leaving it at 20 percent of incomes over $14,000. These dramatic decreases in the maximum surtax
rate were not counterbalanced with equal decreases in tax rates for lower income groups. Indeed,
the gains from changes in tax laws during the 1920s went almost exclusively to those at the upper
reaches of the income ladder. For example, between 1923 and 1929, an individual earning $5,000
175
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before taxes would have seen his disposable yearly income increased by one percent after the
multiple reductions in taxes during the 1920s. On the other hand, an individual earning one million
dollars before taxes would have seen his disposable yearly income increased by 31 percent as a result
of the reductions in surtax rates and the amount of income subject to the different surtaxes. While
these legislated changes in tax were large, they were not the whole story. The Secretary of Treasurer
from 1920 to 1932 and one of the richest men in the United States, Andrew Mellow was found to
have dispensed large refunds, credits, and abatements to those in the upper reaches of the income
ladder. What taxes Treasurer Mellon “could not reduce [through legislation], he could often refund
- a process which had the advantage of taking place behind closed doors,” explains historian Arthur
Schlesinger in his book on the 1920s. “In the first eight years at the Treasury, the Secretary
dispensed $3.5 billion in the shape of cash refunds, credits, and abatements. The size of these
disbursements mounted steadily during the period, except in 1927 and 1930, when congressional
grumbling forced the Treasury to hold back.”176
Coincidence of laws and institutions and inequality and conclusions
To get an idea of the relationship between the evolution of de facto laws and institutions and
income inequality, in figure 3, I graph the percentage of secondary strikes that were enjoined by
decade against the income share of the top one percent of tax units.177 As we can see, there is a
strong positive relationship between income inequality and the orientation of laws and institutions.
Decades where the labor injunction was more vigorously enforced against secondary strikes are
coincident with a higher average income shares for the top one percent of tax units. Decades where
the labor injunction was less vigorously enforced against secondary strikes are coincident with lower
average income shares for the top one percent of tax units.
Figure 3.3: Coincidence of change in laws and institutions and income inequality
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The application of the labor injunction empowered executives and business owners in their
struggle with workers over the distribution of a firm’s revenue. For example, George Pullman,
president and founder of the Pullman Palace Car Company was able to maintain the wage
reductions that sparked the infamous strike of his name. These reductions ranged from 17.5 for
painters to 41 percent for freight-car builders. On average, Pullman employees saw their wages
decrease by 25 percent in the year before the strike. At the same time, the salaries of foremen,
superintendents, and other Pullman officials were not reduced during this period. The total amount
paid out in dividends increased from the previous year. And, on top payment of dividends, the
Pullman Company was still able to pull in over $2 million dollars in profits in 1894 – an incredible
amount for the period.178 As maintained by Eugene Debs and others, the blanket injunction on the
secondary strike which was called to support the plight of Pullman workers was enormously
effective in deciding the outcome of that struggle. If the injunction was less effective, less forcefully
pursued, or not called at all, the outcome likely would have been much different and the distribution
of income inside the Pullman Company for that year and years to come would have been different
also. This battle was played out again and again throughout the United States between the 1870s
and the 1920s. The aggregate effect was not just the income distribution of one firm but the income
distribution for the country as a whole.
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The trend for the percent of secondary strikes enjoined is meant to represent the general
orientation of law and institutions in the United States between the 1870s and 1920s. While there
might be some laws and institutions which followed divergent trends and thus show completely a
completely different relationship with income inequality, the same positive relationship should hold
with at least some other laws. Indeed, this is the case. For example, we can see the same positive
relationship between federal income surtaxes and the income share of the top one percent.
Controlling for Andrew Mellows term as Secretary of Treasurer, variation in the income share of the
top one percent between 1913 and 1928 is positively correlated with over sixty percent of the
variation in top surtax rates. Thus surtax rate followed a remarkably similar trend as that of the
application of the labor injunction to secondary strikes and possessed a similar relationship to
income inequality.
We can now answer the question posited in the beginning of the paper. While all branches
of government were not acting in harmony, the general trend in the de facto orientation of laws and
institutions moved in the same direction as the income share of the top one percent of tax units
between the 1870s and the 1920s. When laws and institutions were oriented to the benefit of those
at the top of the income ladder, as they increasing were between the 1870s and 1920s with the brief
exception during the Progressive era, income inequality was increasing. When laws and institutions
were oriented to benefit broader portions of the population, as they were during the Progressive era,
income inequality was decreasing. Thus, if not a product of, in general government policy embraced
developments in income inequality during this period. Acts purported to reduce inequality through
trust busting or through other avenues often turned out to be mere platitudes.
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CONCLUSION
Alexis De Tocqueville contended that democracy was “an irresistible fact, against which it
would be neither desirable nor prudent to contend.” He predicted that political and social forces
would eliminate all differences, producing a society of equals.179 As we have seen in chapter two,
there is no clear long run trend towards equality of income in the United States. Instead, it seems
that income inequality in the United States has oscillated over time. Furthermore, in terms of
moving to a more equal or unequal society, the political system is not one directional. At times,
democracy works as contended by De Tocqueville and others. Laws and institutions are tilted in the
direction of equality. However, as we have seen in chapter three, during other times, like the 1870s
through the 1920s with the exception of the Progressive Era, laws and institutions can be made to
embrace inequality. While we did not explore in chapter three why this happens, the explanation
from chapter one is that during some periods, certain groups are better able overcome their free
rider problem and take control of policy. Thus, while it might not be desirable for the population as
a whole to disrupt the equalizing power of democracy, we have seen that it is both possible,
desirable, and prudent for certain groups to do so in the United States.
There are some logical questions that follow from the topics and finding of this dissertation.
First, has the dynamic examined in this paper been present in other advanced democracies? As
mentioned at the end of chapter one, income inequality has not followed the same trend in other
advanced democracies.180 This difference in outcomes begs comparative analysis. Is it that the US
political system is different from the political systems in other developed democratic countries? If
so, has this difference enabled the cyclical dynamic of laws and institutions and income inequality in
the United States and muted or eliminated it in other developed democracies? Robert Dahl argues
that the US political system is unique among advanced democracies. Our political system “is among
the most opaque, complex, confusing, and difficult to understand,” explains Dahl. “If it fails to
ensure the fairness promised by the proportional vision, it also fails to provide the clear
accountability promised by the majoritarian vision.”181 Of the elements that make our political
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system comparatively undemocratic, Dahl explains that the strong bicameral legislature which
protects state rights through the upper chamber of Congress and the Supreme Court’s ability to
overturn legislation are two of the most important. As an example of the former, “[b]etween 1800
and 1860 eight anti-slavery measures passed the House,” explains Dahl, “and all were killed in the
Senate.” “Nor did the Southern veto end with the Civil War,” he continues. “After the Civil War,
Senators from elsewhere were compelled to accommodate to the Southern veto in order to secure
the adoption of their own policies.” Indeed, this point has been made by Ira Katznelson in
understanding the dark side of the New Deal.182 In terms of the latter, we have seen in chapter three
the important role the courts, especially the Supreme Court, played from the 1870s through the
1920s in determining de facto law. These elements of our political system which differentiate it
from other advance democracies might explain why the dynamics explains here are unique to the
United States. They might create a political system that is just enough undemocratic such that
narrow groups can take control of policy if they are better able to overcome their free riding
problem than contending groups.
A second question that results from the findings of this dissertation is: if we want a stable
low level of inequality, what type of intervention is needed? This is a difficult question. A first
response might be that we need to make our political system more democratic by moving it towards
the pole of one person one vote. That could be accomplished by reducing the power of the judicial
branch, eliminating the upper chamber of Congress, making representation based on proportion and
not first past the post, and a number of other interventions. However, in terms of change within
our political system, these changes might not be possible. Because the dynamics described in this
dissertation take place inside both the economic and political system, any policy prescription internal
to one of the two spheres would likely fall victim to the very same dynamics outlined in this paper.
As a result, without any exogenous change, we could be eternally trapped in a world where the
orientation of laws and institutions and inequality cycle between embracing and equal and narrow
and unequal.
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